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I. INTRODUCTION
The recently published Australian Government’s Religious
Freedom Review, 1 of December 2018, drew attention to a perceived
“limited understanding in the general [Australian] community about
the human right to religious freedom, its application, and how it
interacts with other human rights.” 2 This is particularly apparent in the
understanding of, and legal implications surrounding, conscience
protection. 3 Countries other than Australia have wrestled with this
problem over extended periods and under diverse circumstances. 4
Australia’s founding fathers borrowed heavily from the United
States in drafting the Australian Constitution. 5 The constitutions of
other countries also have much to offer as Australia now considers how
to protect freedom of conscience and religious practice in a globalized
world. 6 One such country is the Federal Republic of Germany.
1. THE HON. PHILIP RUDDOCK (EXPERT PANEL CHAIR), RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REVIEW:
REPORT OF THE EXPERT PANEL (2018), https://www.pmc.gov.au/domestic-policy/religiousfreedom-review [https://perma.cc/627X-34KD] [hereinafter Ruddock Review].
2. Id. ¶ 1.410.
3. The meanings and history of “freedom of conscience” are much-disputed. For example,
Nehal Bhuta argues, “its contemporary meanings are an unstable mixture of values and
preoccupations derived from distinct political problems—the management of sectarian strife and
the constitution of sovereign power, the bourgeois revolt against the absolutist Polizeistaat, and
finally, a postwar attempt to refound Western European political culture on a politics of human
dignity. This unstable mixture is the foundation for the European Court’s circumstantial
casuistry in the headscarf cases.” See Nehal Bhuta, Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the
European Court of Human Rights, 113 SOUTH ATLANTIC QUARTERLY 9, 11 (2014).
4. See, for example, the reports published by the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom and the materials available at the Pew Research Center
(www.pewforum.org). In Europe, see Martina Prpic, Religion and Human Rights, EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
(2018),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630290/EPRS_BRI(2018)630290_
EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT4D-ZRQ2].
5. This intellectual plundering was, as a rule, quite carefully done. In the words of Clifford
L. Pannam, it was a “very discriminating” exercise; at other times, slavish or even “completely
senseless copying” was arguably the order of the day. Pannam, Travelling Section 116 with a
U.S. Roadmap, 4 MELB. U. L. REV. 41, 41 (1963).
6. For a brief history of conscientious objection at the constitutional level across many
countries, including Germany, see Hon. José de Sousa e Brito, Political Minorities and the Right
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Germany is a leading candidate for comparison because it has a
comprehensive and detailed constitutional guarantee of freedom of
conscience inside a federal structure. In contrast, Australia has
(effectively) no such guarantee and this absence is becoming starker
under the glaring lamps of legal opinion and ensuing legislative
activity. 7 The lack of unity in Australian law has left academics
scratching their heads and has left the Australian polity in an awkward
situation of legal and conceptual disunity. This Article outlines further
reasons for comparison based on the work already done in the realm of
German-American comparison conducted by Edward Eberle.
Thus, this Article explores recent cases regarding conscience and
religious liberty in the German and Australian legal systems and offers
commentary on the context of those cases and the possible implications
for both countries. This Article also follows from this author’s prior
discussion of the approach to conscience protection in Germany taken
by leading constitutional scholar Josef Isensee, as discussed in his
seminal article, “Conscience in Law: Does the General Law Only
Apply in Accordance with the Individual Conscience?” 8 In this and
other work, Isensee highlights, inter alia, the difficulties associated
with a legal definition of conscience in a secular context, the religious
roots of the concept, the difficulties of ever-expanding protection, the

to Tolerance: The Development of a Right to Conscientious Objection in Constitutional Law,
BYU L. REV. 607, 611–16 (1999). (Brito was a Justice of the Constitutional Court of Portugal
from 1989–2002. He perceptively notes, “conscientious objection represents the transformation
of the principle of tolerance, previous to the constitutional state in a human right,” at 608).
7. On August 29, 2019, Christian Porter, the Australian Attorney-General, released an
“exposure draft” Religious Discrimination Bill together with two associated Bills for
consultation and discussion. While the Bill “would make it unlawful to discriminate on the basis
of religious belief or activity in key areas of public life…[t]he Bill does not create a positive
right to freedom of religion.” See Media Release, Thursday, August 29, 2019, Morrison
Government
delivers
on
religious
reforms,
available
at
https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Media/Pages/morrison-government-delivers-on-religiousreforms-29-august-2019.aspx [https://perma.cc/BPW4-CH7W]. This Bill contains 68 sections
in nine parts and seeks to implement many of the recommendation of the Ruddock Report. A
complete consideration of the Bill remains beyond the scope of this Article.
8. Josef Isensee, Gewissen im Recht; Gilt das allgemeine Gesetz nur nach Maßgabe des
individuellen Gewissens? [Conscience in Law; Does the General Law Only Apply in Accordance
with the Individual Conscience?], in DER STREIT UM DAS GEWISSEN [THE DISPUTE OVER
CONSCIENCE] 41, 41 (Gerhard Höver ed., 1993), discussed in Patrick Quirk’s, The Undefined
Remains Unprotected: Tensions between Conscience and the Law in Germany by Way of Joseph
Isensee, 27 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 55, 92 (2018).
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problem of quis iudicabit? [who decides?] and conflict resolution
through partial exemptions. 9
The concept of conscience also has a critical role to play in the
formation of a common culture (Leitkultur). Recent German
constitutional cases appear in a variety of contemporary settings, such
as those related to taking witness oaths, 10 wearing religious clothing
(Islamic headscarves), 11 circumcision ceremonies, 12 acts of ritual
slaughter, 13 displaying Christian crucifixes in classrooms, 14 and refusal
of blood transfusions based on religious beliefs. 15 These significant
cases have contributed to the legal framework inside which the broader
debate over Leitkultur takes place. 16 To some degree, German identity
9. See where Isensee discusses “Konfliktlösung durch partielle Entpflichtung” (resolution
of conflict through partial exemptions).
10. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 33 BVerfGE 26
(1972), 2 BvR 75/71 (23, 33) (Ger.) (deciding that the state should accommodate an evangelical
pastor who refused to swear an oath in a Düsseldorf criminal case based on an interpretation of
the Sermon on the Mount Matthew 5:33-37). The dissent of Justice Von Schlabrendorff is
notable in the way it incorporates the notion of God into the Basic Law: “The preamble of our
Basic Law states that the German people have chosen a new system in the awareness of their
responsibility to God and mankind.” See DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: THIRD EDITION,
REVISED AND EXPANDED 546 (2012) [hereinafter KOMMERS]. Before his elevation to the
Federal Constitutional Court, Judge von Schlabrendorff was one of those tried before the Nazi
People’s Court in 1945 for being part of the plot against Hitler.
11. BVerfGE 2015, 1 BvR 471/10, 1 BvR 1181/10, ¶¶ 1-31 (Ger.) (“The protection
afforded by the freedom of faith and the freedom to profess a belief (Basic Law Article 4, §§1
and 2) guarantees educational staff at interdenominational state schools the freedom to cover
their head in compliance with a rule perceived as imperative for religious reasons. This can be
the case for an Islamic headscarf”); see Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, The German Headscarf
Debate, 2 BYU L. REV. 665, 66 (2004).
12. See Marianne Heimbach-Steins (European Univ. Inst., Robert Schuman Ctr. for
Advanced Studies [hereinafter RACAS]), Religious Freedom and the German Circumcision
Debate 1, 1-16, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/18 addressing a court decision in 2012, which
held that the circumcision of boys amounted to grievous bodily harm; following wide discussion
in Germany, including amongst the Muslim and Jewish groups, the relevant law was updated to
afford the practice protection on religious grounds.
13. BVerfGE 2002, 1 BvR 1783/99, ¶¶ 1-61 (holding ritual slaughter to be an exception
under the Basic Law, Article 4).
14. BVerfGE 1987, 11 BvR 1087/91 (holding, “The affixation of a cross or crucifix in the
classrooms of a State compulsory school that is not a denominational school infringes art; 4(1)
Basic Law”).
15. BVerfGE 1971, 1 BvR 387/65 (deciding that under Article 4 of the Basic Law, blood
transfusions may be refused based on religious belief).
16. For an overview of the German case law until 2004, see Edward J. Eberle, Free
Exercise of Religion in Germany and the United States, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2004). For
a remarkable overview in English—running to 178 pages—of legal provisions affecting religion
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is arguably played out inside these formative legal frameworks. 17 This
article suggests that a comparative reflection of these issues could
helpfully inform constitutional debate in Australia and, to some degree,
Germany at both federal and state levels.
This Article does not consider all of the available ‘conscience
cases,’ but focuses on the German constitutional cases dealing with
headscarves and classroom crucifixes, and two very recent Australian
cases concerning religious headwear in Australian courtrooms. In
broad terms, it considers elements of comparative law, constitutional
law, with the occasional foray into the realm of public reason. Part I
sets out the case for German-Australian comparison. Part II introduces
the problem of defining conscience in a legal context and prepares the
way for a discussion of the law of conscience protection in Germany
and Australia in two key areas: crucifixes and religious clothing. 18 Part
III outlines the German constitutional guarantee while Part IV looks at
the pivotal German crucifix and headscarf cases decided by the Federal
Constitutional Court. Part V will allow for some comparative
observations while discussing in detail several recent Australian court
cases and trends in religious conscience protection which these cases
have presented. In due course, this Article will draw conclusions about
what each country might learn from the other while highlighting what
the Commonwealth of Australia might learn from the Federal Republic
of Germany.
in Germany, see Gerhard Robbers et al., German Legal Provisions Related to Religion in the
Federal Republic of Germany, UNIVERSITY OF TRIER (Aug. 2002), https://www.unitrier.de/fileadmin/fb5/inst/IEVR/Arbeitsmaterialien/Staatskirchenrecht/Deutschland/Religions
normen/German_Legal_Provisions/German_Legal_Provisions_Relating_to_Religion_March_
2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TMS-EHXY]. This study runs a wide range of possible legislative
norms including those at Federal and State levels, laws on education, assembly, media,
monuments, burial codes, funding, labor law, data protection, Church-State treaties, and much
more; see, e.g., herein is found an English translation of the Treaty between the Holy See and
the Free State of Thuringia (Staatsvertrag zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und dem Freistaat
Thüringen), LAW AND ORDINANCE GAZETTE OF THURINGIA [GVBl] June 11, 1997 at 266
(Eng.). This Treaty is also available on the Vatican website (Ger.),
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/1997/documents/rc_seg-st_19970611_ssede-turingia_ge.html [https://perma.cc/EWN4-ZJ3B] (last visited Apr. 27, 2019).
17. Culture War Over German Identity: Religious Symbols Take Center Stage, SPIEGEL ONLINE
(May 3, 2018), https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/religious-symbols-at-heart-ofgerman-search-for-identity-a-1205572.html [https://perma.cc/64M3-ARXT].
18. Other areas of conflict in the realm of religious freedom and “conscientious objection”
such as cooperation in abortion, euthanasia or any number of other morally charged scenarios
lie beyond the scope of this article.
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II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR GERMAN-AUSTRALIAN
COMPARISON
Edward J. Eberle persuasively argues the benefits of comparing
the US and German jurisprudence on religion and religious freedom.19
His arguments, it is submitted, are equally coherent in comparing
Australia with Germany, at least over the past several decades. 20 He
notes significant developments in the law in recent years, especially in
the United States, under the guidance of US Chief Justice William
Rehnquist. 21 The brisk pace of these developments has not been
matched in Australia. The unhurried, or even dawdling development of
religious freedom laws in Australia supports an inquiry into the reasons
for the lack of improvement. 22 In addition, the few recent but
significant Australian court cases that have been handed down bear
serious consideration, including one concerning the issue of religious
freedom in a corporate context. 23 Other comparative studies also merit
discussion but will not be the focus of this article. 24
Eberle asserts that “German law accords wider scope to individual
free exercise freedoms than American law.” 25 This greater latitude is
19. Eberle, supra note 16, at 1023.
20. While going back further might allow an opportunity for consideration of larger forces
at work (e.g., the rise of National Socialism or the fall of the Weimar Republic), doing so is
beyond the scope of this study.
21. Eberle, supra note 16, at 1025 (referring generally to the change of emphasis from that
under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) to that of Emp’t Division, Department of Human
Resources. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
22. See Denise Meyerson, The Protection of Religious Rights under Australian Law, BYU
L. REV. 529, 552 (2009) (concluding that there are “significant gaps in the de iure protection
afforded religion. Legal protection for religious rights in Australia is not only limited but also
affected by arbitrary factors such as where a person lives and whether the religious group to
which he/she belongs can be categorized as an ‘ethnic’ group”).
23. Christian Youth Camps Ltd v. Cobaw Community Health Services Ltd (“Cobaw”)
(2014) 308 ALR 615, 617 (Court of Appeal) (Austl.) (Victorian Court of Appeal holding, inter
alia, that a corporation could not claim “personhood” for the purposes of a religious exemption).
For commentary, see generally Shawn Rajanayagam & Carolyn M., Evans, Corporations and
Freedom of Religion: Australia and the United States Compared, 37 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW 329
(2015) (arguing that corporations should not possess a right to religious freedom). This is such
a large area for discussion that it must be left for another day.
24. See Iain T. Benson, Religious Liberty in Australia: Some Suggestions and Proposals
for Reframing Traditional Categorisations, 139 ZADOK PERSPECTIVES 10, 17 (2018) (an
evaluative review of religious freedom laws in Australia, Canada, and South Africa). See
generally STEPHEN V. MANSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM:
CHURCH AND STATE IN SIX DEMOCRACIES (2017) [hereafter Mansma & Soper].
25. EBERLE, supra note 16, at 1026.
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arguably also the case in any Australia-Germany comparison,
especially since the so-called ‘religion clause’ in the Australian
Constitution (section 116) has been narrowly construed by the courts,
despite its similarity with parts of the US First Amendment. 26 Further,
Eberle views Germany as “a highly developed, industrial, democratic
society committed to constitutional government and situated within the
Western cultural tradition.” 27 So too may Australia easily lay claim to
such a description and even assert democratic traditions that antedate
those of the Weimar Republic. 28 Eberle argues, “German freedoms are
roughly comparable to American freedoms as a matter of text,
historical understanding, and constitutional design.” 29 This claim is
also worth exploring at various levels of a German-Australian
comparison, despite the constitutional and historical divergences
apparent between Australia and Germany. 30
Beyond Eberle’s comparative model, other cogent reasons for
embarking on a comparison between Germany and Australia exist,
including the multicultural social environment of both countries, their
recent, sometimes fraught, immigration histories,31 their activities in
26. See generally CAROLINE MAREE EVANS, LEGAL PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA 71 (1st ed. 2012) (on the limited scope of Section 116 of the Australian
Constitution). For a discussion of section 116 in the context of a proposed Australian Bill of
Rights, see Paul Babie & Neville Rochow, Feels Like Déjà Vu: An Australian Bill of Rights and
Religious Freedom, 2010 BYU L. REV. 821, 825 (2010).
27. Eberle, supra note 16, at 1026.
28. Germany was declared a federal republic at the beginning of the German Revolution
in November 1918. On August 11, 1919, President Friedrich Ebert signed the democratic
Weimar Constitution.
29. Eberle, supra note 16, at 1027.
30. Despite a justifiable bias in favor of highlighting the Anglo-centric origins of the
Australian Constitution, German and Swiss ideas, mediated through the work of Johann Caspar
Bluntschli (1808–1881) and Georg Jellinek (1851–1911), also played a significant role. see
Nicholas Aroney, The Influence of German State-Theory on the Design of the Australian
Constitution, 59 (3) INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 669, 669–99 (2010) (drawing attention to a critical but
neglected story about the dissemination of German and Swiss state-theories among Englishspeaking scholars in the second half of the 19th century and the influence of these ideas on those
who designed and drafted the Australian constitution).
31. The immigration debate in both countries has been long and sometimes painful. The
German Basic Law is rare amongst world constitutions in that it provides a constitutional right
to asylum (Article 16a). In 2015, German Minister of State Maria Böhmer stated, “Germany is
new to acknowledge that it is an immigrant country. . . Australia has a lot of experience in this
area [of diversity].” See Latika Bourke, Germany Is Looking to Australia’s Success as an
Immigration
Nation,
SYDNEY
MORNING
HERALD
(Dec.
10,
2015)
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/germany-is-looking-to-australias-success-as-animmigration-nation-20151210-gljuhu.html [https://perma.cc/KEZ8-NWBU].

170

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1

defending religious freedom at the international level, and their
complex church-state relations in such areas as school funding and
general welfare provision. 32 One may also consider that even though
Germany, like England, is perhaps (at least historically) more familiar
with the idea of a confessional state, Australia shares enough English
legal history to be considered a distant but legal part of that tradition.33
Finally, looking into the future, the classical problems of
conscience, such as those arising in the military and medical contexts,
are also now being aggravated and even overtaken by advances in
technology with implications that regularly extend beyond national
borders. 34 Recent examples of this lie in the questions raised by “moral
machines,” 35 autonomous cars, 36 and a remarkable “digital case study,”
32. For a discussion of Church-State relations and in the areas of welfare and education in
Australia and Germany in particular, see chapters 5 (Australia) and 7 (Germany) see generally
MANSMA AND SOPER, supra note 24.
33. Soper would disagree, assigning Australia to the category of “pragmatic pluralist”
(along with The Netherlands, a “principled pluralist” country); see MANSMA & SOPER, supra
note 24, at 85ff. Germany and England are each assigned a category closer to that of the
confessionalized state.
34. For example, consider the “actions” of autonomous weapons systems across national
borders and the extent to which their activities may be sheeted home to human actors. See
Duncan B. Hollis, Setting the Stage: Autonomous Legal Reasoning in International
Humanitarian Law, 30 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 15 (2016) (setting the stage for a symposium
on the issues surrounding autonomous weapons systems in the context of Saint Thomas
Aquinas' classic analysis of human acts). In the medico-military context see generally
Christopher E. Sawin, Creating Super Soldiers for Warfare: A Look into the Laws of War, 17 J.
HIGH TECH. L. 105 (2016) (arguing that the use of technology to create superior soldiers is not
currently prohibited under humanitarian laws of war). This raises the question as to whether
super-soldiers, bred for battle and with genetic or drug-induced limitations on their power to
empathize, are even human and thus capable of conscientious objection. Other areas of concern
for conscience in the non-military medical context could include extreme cosmetic surgery, or
other forms of advanced but unnecessary treatment.
35. See Mass. Inst. of Tech. (MIT), About Moral Machine, MORAL MACHINE,
http://moralmachine.mit.edu/ [https://perma.cc/T9GQ-8FVG] (last visited Apr. 27, 2019).
About machine intelligence overtaking human decision making, Iyad Rahwan, Edmond Awad,
& Sohan Dsouza stated, “[f]rom self-driving cars on public roads to self-piloting reusable
rockets landing on self-sailing ships, machine intelligence is supporting or entirely taking over
ever more complex human activities at an ever-increasing pace. The greater autonomy given
machine intelligence in these roles can result in situations where they have to make autonomous
choices involving human life and limb. This calls for not just a clearer understanding of how
humans make such choices, but also a clearer understanding of how humans perceive machine
intelligence making such choices”). See Ethics of Autonomous Vehicles, WINBROOK,
http://www.rri-tools.eu:8080/-/moral-machine [https://perma.cc/8HGX-ZT8A].
36. Can Autonomous Cars Have a Moral Conscience? Views from DW’s science desk, DW
(Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/can-autonomous-cars-have-a-moral-conscience-
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in which Google engineers claimed conscientious objection against
participation in software manufacture designed to improve
international military drone targeting. 37 Although these topics are
beyond the scope of this Article, they demonstrate that the defense of
conscience, and the associated freedom of religion will remain firmly
on the social and legal agendas for the foreseeable future.
III. DEFINING ‘CONSCIENCE’ FOR LEGAL PURPOSES
Definitions of the notion of conscience usually belong in the
realms of theology and moral philosophy. Both areas typically draw
deeply on religious origins, but now also find some forms of secular
definition. 38 An example of the former is to be discovered in the work
of John Henry Newman, who speaks of conscience as the voice of
views-from-dws-science-desk/a-46056690 [https://perma.cc/CP5K-LXDU] (last visited Apr.
26, 2019).
37. Shane Scott & Wakabayashi Daisuke, ‘The Business of War’: Google Employees
Protest
Work
for
the
Pentagon,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
4,
2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html
[https://perma.cc/6J83-TT5M] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019) (“Thousands of Google employees,
including dozens of senior engineers, have signed a letter protesting the company’s involvement
in a Pentagon program that uses artificial intelligence to interpret video imagery and could be
used to improve the targeting of drone strikes”). Google reportedly disengaged from this work
at a later date. See Shane Scott & Wakabayashi Daisuke, Google Will Not Renew Pentagon
Contract
that
Upset
Employees,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
1,
2018)
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/google-pentagon-project-maven.html
[https://perma.cc/UB63-4GL7] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019). Google later produced a set of AI
objectives precluding its use in weapons and human rights violations; see Devin Coldeway,
Google’s New ‘AI Principles’ Forbid Its Use in Weapons and Human Rights Violations,
TECHCRUNCH (June 7, 2018) http://social.techcrunch.com/2018/06/07/googles-new-aiprinciples-forbid-its-use-in-weapons-and-human-rights-violations/ [https://perma.cc/3HMY8SFX] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019). For Al’s seven objectives, see Sundar Puchai, Al at Google:
Our Principles, GOOGLE (June 7, 2018), https://www.blog.google/technology/ai/ai-principles/
[https://perma.cc/M58Y-STH9] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019).
38. See JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE 13 (Jane Marie Todd, trans., 2011) (“Core beliefs and commitments, which we will
also call ‘convictions of conscience,’ include both deeply held religious and secular beliefs and
are distinguished from the legitimate but less fundamental ‘preferences’ we display as
individuals”) [hereafter MACLURE & TAYLOR]. This is an English translation of DOMINIQUE
LEYDET, LAÏCITÉ ET LIBERTÉ DE CONSCIENCE LES ÉDITIONS DU BORÉAL (2010). For a critical
review of Maclure and Taylor, see generally Jude P. Dougherty et al., Secularism and Freedom
of Conscience, 65 REV. OF METAPHYS. 434 (2011). For a review of SORABJI, see Margaret
Atkins, MORAL CONSCIENCE THROUGH THE AGES by Richard Sorabji, NEW BLACKFRIARS
736-38 (Oct. 5, 2016), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/nbfr.3_12239
[https://perma.cc/JT64-G58D].
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God. 39 The more secular manifestation may be found, for example, in
the work of Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, where conscience is
discussed not only on a religious basis but also in the context of deeply
held secular convictions. 40 However, conscience, as defined by
theologians or philosophers, is not something necessarily (or easily)
translatable into a legal definition interpretable by citizens and,
ultimately, by the courts. 41 Isensee has labeled this the ultimate legal
problem of defining conscience (the “definitions problem”); 42 this is a
problem that cannot be avoided by courts or lawyers when the word is
used in a piece of legislation, or, indeed, in an elemental document like
a national constitution. The Federal Republic of Germany exemplifies
just such a case because the foundational document of the Rechtstaat,43
the German Basic Law (Constitution), uses the word ‘conscience’ five
times in three different Articles. 44 The term must, then, be given a
meaning that is legally stable and able to be used over time, in cases
that concern different and diverse facts (Tatbestände). Once
established, such a definition must also be applied in order to decide
cases between parties with mixed and often contrary interests. We now
turn to explore more precisely what the Basic Law guarantees its
citizens in this area.
39. John Henry Newman asserts, “conscience is the voice of God, whereas it is fashionable
on all hands now to consider it in one way or another a creation of man”; see Letter from John
Henry Newman to the Duke of Norfolk, in THE GENIUS OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN: SELECTIONS
FROM HIS WRITINGS 262-263 (Ian T. Ker ed., 1989).
40. See generally MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 38.
41. The discussion surrounding what lawyers and judges actually do when they interpret
words and the rules that contain them is an interesting one; see generally DAVID MIERS &
WILLIAM TWINING, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH RULES: A PRIMER OF INTERPRETATION (5th ed.
2010). This discussion sometimes lapses into a “rivalry of emphasis” between interpretive
approaches to statute law and common law case law; see Janet S. Lindgren & John Henry
Schlegel, Review: Thinking about Statutes: Hurst, Calabresi, Twining and Miers, 9 AM. BAR
FOUND. J. 458, 458-68 (1984).
42. Isensee, supra note 8, at 46.
43. In German, this Rechtsstaat is sometimes contrasted with the Polizeistaat (police
state). For a recent book-length treatment of the concept of the Rechsstaat, see generally
STEPHAN KRISTE, THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGAL STATE
(RECHTSSTAAT) (James R. Silkenat et al. eds., 2014).
44. See GRUNDGESETZ (GG) [BASIC LAW] and in particular, art. 4 (Freedom of Faith,
Conscience, and Creed); art. 12a (Compulsory Military or Alternative Service); and art. 38
(Elections: Elected Members of the Bundestag are to be “representatives of the whole people,
not bound by orders or instructions, and responsible only to their conscience”); translation
available
at
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/chancellor/basic-law-470510
[https://perma.cc/A53C-K7PG].
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IV. THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE
Freedom of conscience is guaranteed in broad terms by Article 4
[Freedom of Faith, Conscience, and Creed] of the German Basic Law:
(1) Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom to profess a
religious or philosophical creed, shall be inviolable.
(2) The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.
(3) No person shall be compelled against his conscience to render
military service involving the use of arms. Details shall be
regulated by a federal law. 45

The guarantees in sections (1) and (2) are notably free from
qualification or limitation while, due to associated “federal
regulations,” section (3) is not. Collectively, these serious and
comprehensive guarantees were forged in the aftermath of World War
II, as well as in the rooms of the Royal Palace of Herrenchiemsee in
August of 1948. 46 Intended at the time as a merely transitional
document, the Basic Law was broadly interpreted by the newly-formed
Federal Constitutional Court during the 1950s as a bulwark of
fundamental rights. Cases like Elfes47 and Lüth 48 and their progeny
made the Court, and by implication the Constitution, “a moral success
story to match the economic miracle.” 49 The document has shown
remarkable endurance despite some democratic alterations and updates
along the way. 50
45. Id. art. 4.
46. On the processes and outcomes of drafting three German Constitutions, including the
successful Basic Law of 1949, see Inga Markovitz, Constitution Making after National
Catastrophes: Germany in 1949 and 1990, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1307, 1307-46 (2007).
47. BVerfGE 3, 58. “In Elfes, the Court developed the famous concept of a ‘general’
fundamental right, which can be invoked against any act of public authority to vindicate
freedoms not explicitly guaranteed by the constitutional text.” Florian Meinel, The
Constitutional Miracle on the Rhine: Towards a History of West German Constitutionalism and
the Federal Constitutional Court, 14 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 261, 284 (2016).
48. BVerfGE 7, 198 (extending constitutional oversight even into the area of private law);
Meinel, supra note 47, at 284.
49. JUSTIN COLLINGS, DEMOCRACY’S GUARDIANS: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 1951–2001 61 (2015); Meinel, supra note 47, at 261. For a
discussion in English of the theories of fundamental rights under the German Basic Law, see
generally KOMMERS, supra note 10. For a less glowing assessment of German moral and
economic success, see Paul Hockenos, Germany has an Arrogance Problem, FOREIGN POLICY
(MAY 6, 2019) https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/27/germany-is-getting-too-arrogant-merkel
[https://perma.cc/M2BZ-2YCP].
50. The Basic Law has been updated sixty-two times since 1949.

174

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1

The guarantee in Article 4 must be seen in the light of other
provisions of the Basic Law, which deal with relations between church
and state more generally. These include Article 140, which sweeps up
five articles of the Weimar Constitution, 51 including a particularly
German form of the non-establishment clause, 52 and incorporates them
into the Basic Law. These five articles (sixteen paragraphs in total) deal
generally with religion and religious associations, including such
matters of “status, powers, and duties of religious associations.”53
There are also important far-reaching economic ties between churches
and the German state in the form of the Kirchensteuer (the church tax,
authorized under the above provisions of the Weimar Constitution),54
indexed endowment payments (compensation for historical
confiscations of Church property), 55 and other welfare provisions. 56
Other provisions scattered throughout the Basic Law also protect
religious belief (and thereby conscience) more indirectly. These appear
51. Arts. 136-40.
52. Article 137(1) provides, somewhat bluntly, “There shall be no state church.” As
Kommers notes, this is quite different from the US version of non-establishment. “Rather than
the “separationist approach taken in the United States, Germany’s system may be described as
cooperative, anticipating a limited partnership between church and state.” KOMMERS, supra note
10, at 539. As discussed below, when compared to the United States, the situation in Germany
is far more similar to that of Australia.
53. KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 538.
54. Specifically, article 137(6), which provides “Religious societies that are corporations
under public law shall be entitled to levy taxes on the basis of the civil taxation lists in
accordance with Land (State) law.” THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN REICH, Aug. 11, 1919,
art. 137(6).
55. The 100th anniversary of the decision to cease such payments occurred in 2019. To
date, these payments continue since—it has been alleged—it would cost the government far too
much to retire them. Not all states are affected (e.g., Bremen and Hamburg). The Religion News
Service reports, “[o]fficially, the historical payments known as “endowments,” fork out taxpayer
funds to compensate the churches for valuable farmlands and buildings that secular rulers have
taken from them over the centuries. Some were seized by the French after Napoleon annexed
lands up to the western banks of the Rhine River two centuries ago; other confiscations go back
to the Reformation.” Tom Heneghan, Germany Continues Payments to Churches a Century after
Deciding
to
Stop,
RELIGION
NEWS
SERVICE
(Feb.
13,
2019),
https://religionnews.com/2019/02/13/germany-continues-payments-to-churches-a-centuryafter-deciding-to-stop/?utm_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_campaign=05db11d2c3EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_02_14_02_52&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953b9b7005db11d2c3-399905589 [https://perma.cc/X3NY-3ZFU].
56. For example, Caritas, an organization of the Catholic Bishops Conference of Germany,
has more than half a million staff working in Germany and about half a million volunteers. The
international department of Caritas Germany is working with a staff of about 100. See Germany,
https://www.caritas.org/where-caritas-work-europe/germany/ [https://perma.cc/5ND9-RWQ2]
(last visited Apr. 26, 2019).
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in provisions on equality, 57 suitability for public office, 58 freedom from
compelled religious exercise or disclosure, 59 including oath-taking and
use of an affirmation by citizens or the President taking office. 60 Even
less direct, but significant, protection is found in rights of parents to
decide whether children receive religious instruction in state schools.61
It should also be noted that the European Convention of Human Rights
offers a more qualified guarantee of some of these rights. 62
V. CRUCIFIXES, CLOTHING, AND GERMAN CONSCIENCE
CASES
A. The German Crucifix Cases
The display of crosses or crucifixes has been the subject of
litigation in European courts at different times over the last few

57. “No person shall be favoured or disfavoured because of sex, parentage, race, language,
homeland and origin, faith or religious or political opinions. No person shall be disfavoured
because of disability.” BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, May 23, 1949,
art. 3(3).
58. “Neither the enjoyment of civil and political rights nor eligibility for public office nor
rights acquired in the public service shall be dependent upon religious affiliation. No one may
be disadvantaged by reason of adherence or non-adherence to a particular religious
denomination or philosophical creed.” BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
May 23, 1949, art 33(3).
59. “No person shall be required to disclose his religious convictions. The authorities shall
have the right to inquire into a person’s membership of a religious society only to the extent that
rights or duties depend upon it or that a statistical survey mandated by a law so requires.” THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN REICH, Aug. 11, 1919, art 136(3) (incorporated by article 140
of the Basic Law).
60. Article 136(4) of the Weimer Constitution provides “No person may be compelled to
perform any religious act or ceremony, to participate in religious exercises or to take a religious
form of oath.” After providing the form of the Oath of Office, the final sentence of Article 56
provides: “The oath may also be taken without religious affirmation.” THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE GERMAN REICH, Aug. 11, 1919, art 136(4). See generally KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 538.
61. “(1) The entire school system shall be under the supervision of the state. (2) Parents
and guardians shall have the right to decide whether children shall receive religious instruction.
(3) Religious instruction shall form part of the regular curriculum in state schools, with the
exception of non-denominational schools. Without prejudice to the state’s right of supervision,
religious instruction shall be given in accordance with the tenets of the religious community
concerned. Teachers may not be obliged against their will to give religious instruction.” BASIC
LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, May 23, 1949, art. 7(1)-(3).
62. A. H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 144-47 (Manchester Uni. Press ed.,
Oceana Publications, 1963) (1964).
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decades, most notably in Germany and Italy. 63 The topic continues to
generate controversy as evidenced by a 2018 Bavarian mandate to affix
crucifixes in the entrances of public buildings. 64
In Germany, two major constitutional cases are essential to
consider. First, in the 1973 Courtroom Crucifix Case, 65 the question
was whether a Düsseldorf Administrative Court may display a crucifix
over the objections of a Jewish litigant. 66 The result, on appeal to the
Federal Constitutional Court, saw the crucifix taken down, but without
a general prohibition on their placement in a courtroom. 67 In doing so,
the Court was careful to reiterate the principle of state neutrality. 68
In the second case, the Classroom Crucifix Case II (1995) 69 the
Federal Constitutional Court held that a Bavarian law requiring
crucifixes be placed on the wall of state classrooms was a violation of
the German Federal Constitution (Basic Law). 70 This case, and its
preceding litigation created a firestorm of public protest and
63. Aside from Germany, the Italian case of Lautsi v. Italy (2011) holding that an Italian
law mandating the display of crucifixes in classrooms does not violate the European Convention
on Human Rights. See generally Grégor Puppinck, The Case of Lautsi v. Italy: A Synthesis, 3
BYU L. REV. 873 (2012).
64. Guy Chazan, Bavaria Imposes Law on Displaying Cross in State Buildings, Financial
Times (June 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/1e2bec76-6572-11e8-a39d-4df188287fff
[https://perma.cc/NP6K-4LBT] (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
65. 35 BVerfGE [Federal Constitutional Court] 366 (1973).
66. The court held that such a display was lawful and “the mere presence of a crucifix in
a courtroom does not demand any identification with the ideas and institutions symbolically
embodies therein or compel any specific behavior in accordance thereof.” Id. KOMMERS, supra
note 10, at 545.
67. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Private Religious Choice in German and American
Constitutional Law: Government Funding and Government Religious Speech, 31 V AND J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1127, 1129 (1998). See also KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 545.
68. 35 BVerfGE [Federal Constitutional Court] 366, 375 (1973).
69. See KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 577-83. Note that the preceding case from 1991,
known as Classroom Crucifix I Case, the Federal Constitutional Court considered—and
rejected—a request for an injunction to take down the crucifix. See 85 BVerfGE 94 (1991).
BVerfGE 93, 11 BVR 1087/91 Kruzifix-decision (“Classroom Crucifix Case”) (Ger.), May 12,
1987,
translated
in
https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-lawtranslations/german/case.php?id=615#top [https://perma.cc/H78Y-XJNH]. Classroom Crucifix
II went beyond the procedural issues associated with an injunction and dealt with the substantive
arguments.
70. BVerfGE 1987, 11 BvR 1087/91 (Ger.), May 12, 1987, translated in
https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=615#top
[https://perma.cc/H78Y-XJNH] (holding that “the affixation of a cross or crucifix in the
classrooms of a State compulsory school that is not a denominational school infringes art. 4(1)
of the Basic Law”).
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discussion. 71 Bavaria’s pragmatic response was to draft a new law (in
1995), which was later confirmed as constitutional in Bavaria and
Berlin in 1997. 72 As summarized by Ingrid Brunk Weurth:
The new [1995] law draws substantially from a report
commissioned by the state of Bavaria and written by Peter Badura,
former president of the Federal Constitutional Court. Like the old
law, the new one provides for crosses in Bavarian classrooms.
Under the new law, however, if parents object to the cross based
on honest and “visible” or expressible principles of their faith or
world view, then the school must seek a compromise. If it finds no
compromise, then the school must create a rule for each individual
case that respects the freedom of the complainant and the religious
views of everyone in the class. In that decision the school must
consider, to the greatest degree possible, the desires of the
majority. The new law, according to Badura, stays within the
“Spielraum” or “room for play” afforded to the states by the Basic
Law and Constitutional Court’s 1995 decision (citations
omitted). 73

The cultural impacts and debates were significant across Germany but
more so in the south than in the north. 74 Citizens of the former German
Democratic Republic (GDR) were perhaps less interested in such
disputes. 75 Some commentators have criticized the final decision as one
that generated more conflict than it resolved and that might lead to a
legitimate “questioning of the constitutionalists monopoly of virtue.” 76
The nature of the alleged affront to the conscience of the litigant
in the Courtroom Crucifix Case and to the child and parents in the
Classroom Crucifix case(s) bears some discussion in the context of
conscience protection in schools. Here, noticeable differences exist
between the majority and dissenting judgments. After a discussion of
the principle of tolerance, the minority decided that no unacceptable
71. Stephen Kinzer, Crucifix Ruling Angers Bavarians, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 1995),
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/23/world/crucifix-ruling-angers-bavarians.html
[https://perma.cc/FB6E-8A64].
72. Inke Muehlhoff, Freedom of Religion in Public Schools in Germany and in the United
States, 28 GA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 405, 491 (1999). See James Arthur, Learning under the
Cross: Legal Challenges to ‘Cultural-Religious Symbolism’ in Public Schools, 20 EDUCATION
& THE LAW 337, 341 (2008).
73. Wuerth, supra note 67.
74. See Peter C. Caldwell, The Crucifix and German Constitutional Culture, 11 CULT.
ANTHROPOL. 259, 272 (1996).
75. Id.
76. Howard Cagill & Alan Scott, The Basic Law versus the Basic Norm? The Case of the
Bavarian Crucifix Order, 44 POL. STUD. 413, 506-16 (1996).
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burden was imposed on the conscience of students exposed to the
classroom crucifix, nor by implication to their parents. They noted:
In view of the cross’s symbolic character, non-Christian pupils and
their parents are obligated to accept its presence in the classroom.
The principal of tolerance requires as much, and the display of the
cross does not constitute an unacceptable burden on the religious
conscience of non-Christian pupils.
The psychological effect that exposure to the cross has on nonChristian pupils is relatively mild. The mental burden here is
minimal, for pupils are not required to behave in a given way or to
participate in religious practices before the cross. In contrast to
compulsory school prayer, pupils are not forced to reveal the
ideological or religious convictions through nonparticipation. This
precludes any discrimination against them. 77

Terms such as “psychological effect” (upon students) or “mental
burden” due to exposure to religious symbols are, the court appears to
argue, a lesser form of interference with conscience than a requirement
forcing one to act, behave, or participate in a religious ceremony or
activity (e.g., prayer). This is in keeping with the earlier decision
affirming positive religious freedom in cases concerning school prayer
decided in 1979.78
The majority dealt with the issue quite differently, finding that
such a burden did exist and that the crucifix could not be left on the
wall, but must be removed as constitutionally inappropriate. The court
made a number of points in reaching this conclusion, the following of
which touch directly or indirectly upon the question of the burdens of
conscience:
• In a society that tolerates a wide variety of faith commitments,
the individual clearly has no right to be spared exposure to
77. KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 583.
78. Id. at 567-71; Wuerth summarizes: “Rejecting the lower court’s conclusion that the
prayers were coercive, the court reasoned that the right to not reveal one’s religious convictions
did not take precedence over the rights of others to practice their religious beliefs. Moreover, the
court pointed out, the Basic Law itself created situations, particularly the refusal to bear arms,
in which those who seek exemptions must similarly reveal something of their religious
convictions. The court went on to note that in exceptional cases particularly sensitive students
in unsympathetic schools might mean that the school must forego the prayers, but this did not
justify the lower court’s conclusion that any and all such prayers were unconstitutional. The
court made clear that the positive freedoms involved did not compel schools to institute prayers.”
Wuerth supra note 10, at 1180-81.
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quaint religious manifestation, sectarian activities, or religious
symbols. 79
Given the context of compulsory education, the presence of
crosses in classrooms amounts to state-enforced “learning
under the cross,” with no possibility to avoid seeing the symbol.
This constitutes the critical difference between the display of
the cross in a classroom and the religious symbols people
frequently encounter in their daily lives. 80
The cross, now as before, represents a specific tenet of
Christianity; it constitutes its most significant faith symbol. It
symbolizes human redemption from original sin through
Christ’s sacrifice just as it represents Christ’s victory over
Satan and death and his power over the world. Accordingly, the
cross symbolizes both suffering and triumph . . . to this day, the
presence of a cross in a home or room is understood as an
expression of the dweller’s Christian faith. 81
On the other hand, because of the significance Christianity
attributes to the cross, non-Christians and atheists perceive it to
be the symbolic expression of certain faith convictions and a
symbol of missionary zeal. To see the cross as nothing more
than a cultural artifact of the Western tradition without any
particular religious meaning would amount to a profanation
contrary to the self-understanding of Christians and the
Christian church. 82
Coercion is to be reduced to an indispensable minimum. In
particular, the school must not proselytize on behalf of a
particular religious doctrine or actively promote the tenets of
the Christian faith. 83

And finally:
• Christianity’s influence on culture and education may be
affirmed and recognized, but not particular articles of faith.
Christianity as a cultural force incorporates in particular the
idea of tolerance toward people of different persuasions.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 578.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 579-80.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 581.
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Confrontation with a Christian worldview will not lead to
discrimination or devaluation of a non-Christian ideology so
long as the state does not impose the values of the Christian
faith on non-Christians; indeed, the state must foster the
autonomous thinking that Article 4 of the Basic Law secures
within the religious and ideological realms. 84
While difficult to summarize, the above approach takes the claims
of Christianity seriously (‘Christ’s victory’), and at the same time, takes
a ‘hands-off’ approach to the imposition of values. This approach,
arguably, is a strong endorsement of the freedom of conscience policy
sought to be promoted by Article 4. On the other hand, the “mild
psychological effect” of being required to study under the cross
claimed by the dissenting judges would seem to agree in substance with
the majority about protecting the individual’s conscience but differ on
the degree of exposure that is burdensome. Unlike the majority, the
dissent also makes clear that the cross does not “imply any kind of
missionary activity.” 85 Based on these arguments, the difference
between the majority and minority opinions seems to be more one of
degree than substance.
B. Major German Headscarf Decisions
The so-called headscarf debate (Kofptuchdebatte) in Germany has
been raging for years and been the subject of multiple cases, including
two at the level of the Federal Constitutional Court. 86 Both of these
cases related to headscarves worn by teachers in state schools, but
headscarves in courtrooms have also been much-disputed, even as

84. Id. at 581.
85. Id. at 583.
86. These cases were decided in 2003 and 2015. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE]
[Federal Constitutional Court], 24, 2003, 2 BvR 1436/02 [hereinafter First Headscarf Decision].
While only the German version is authoritative, an English translation is available on the
German
Federal
Constitutional
Court
website
at
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2003/09/rs200309
24_2bvr143602en.html [https://perma.cc/7FFD-VNE7] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], January 27, 2015, 1 BvR
471/10, (Ger.) [hereafter Second Headscarf Decision]. See the copious references in Kerstin
Braun, How Much Veil Is Too Much Veil: On the Constitutionality and Advisability of Face
Bans for German Public School Students, 18 GERMAN L. J. 1331, 1331–58 (2017).
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recently as 2013, 87 and a 2019 Bavarian case confirming that
headscarves are not to be worn by judges or prosecutors. 88
The link between conscience and the wearing of items of clothing
deserves some preliminary discussion. By way of introduction, it is
important to note that the headscarf debate covers a wide range of
issues and is extremely complex, touching upon many questions,
including intra-religious expression. These intra-religious expressions
and expectations of dress codes are based on differing interpretations
of the Qur’an, 89 inter-religious relations and the singling-out of
particular religions for special treatment, 90 the equal treatment of men
and women, 91 psychological effects on students, 92 parental rights, and
workplace clothing codes and the associated labor laws, especially in
public service. 93 Further, the legal issues as they relate specifically to
conscience protection are also complex.
1. The First Headscarf Decision
The First Headscarf Decision concerned a German citizen, who
applied to teach in state primary and secondary schools, 94 in the Land
(Federal state) of Baden-Württemberg. 95 In addition to implicating
87. See Joachim Wagner, Legal Limbo: Lawyers Seek Clarity on Headscarves in Court,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/muslimlawyers-seek-clarity-on-allowance-of-headscarf-in-court-a-922522.html
[https://perma.cc/K43E-FCMA].
88. Germany: Bavarian Court Upholds Headscarf Ban for Judges, Prosecutors, DW
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/germany-bavarian-court-upholds-headscarf-ban-forjudges-prosecutors/a-47960676 [https://perma.cc/3P5L-ZQYN].
89. See generally Heiner Bielefeldt, Zur aktuellen Kopftuchdebatte in Deutschland—
Anmerkungen aus der Perspektive der Menschenrechte [On the Current Headscarf Debate in
Germany—Observation from the Human Rights Perspective], DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR
MENSCHENRECHTE
[GERMAN
INSTITUTE
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS]
https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/31669/ssoar-2004-bielefeldtZur_aktuellen_Kopftuchdebatte_in_Deutschland.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QZ6-3SNE].
90. Id.
91. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany art. 3(2) provides that “[m]en and
women shall have equal rights.”
92. Bielefeldt, supra note 89, at 5.
93. See Achim Seifert, Religious Expression in the Workplace: The Case of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 529, 568 (2009).
94. The Stuttgart Higher School Authority was responsible for teachers at both primary
(Grundschule) and non-selective secondary (Hauptschule) schools.
95. The main protagonist has since written a book on the case and other matters; see
generally Fereshta Ludin, ENTHÜLLUNG DER FERESHTA LUDIN. DIE MIT DEM KOPFTUCH [THE
UNVEILING OF FERESHTA LUDIN: THE ONE WITH THE HEADSCARF] (2015).
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Article 4 of the Basic Law, the case also required analysis of Articles
33(1) and 33(2), which guarantee equal political status in the areas of
eligibility for and performance in public service. 96
The complainant’s application was progressively rejected by the
Stuttgart Higher School Authority, the Stuttgart Administrative Court,
the Stuttgart Administrative Court, the Baden-Wurttemberg Higher
Administrative Court, and the Federal Administrative Court. 97 The
various stages of appeal allowed for lengthy public as well as legal
debates, and, as illustrated below, full consideration of the many
arguments both for and against the state’s refusal to grant accreditation.
These included discussions of religious identity; 98 state neutrality in the
presence of religious symbolism, as well as the various degrees of such
symbolism; 99 the extent of students’ rights to “negative religious
freedom;” 100 parents natural rights to the care and upbringing of
children under Article 6.2 of the Basic Law; 101 state neutrality; 102
students’ rights when confronted with an ongoing “expression of
faith;” 103 the effects of a teaching wearing a headscarf on “schoolgirls

96. Article 33 provides, inter alia, (1) Every German shall have in every Land the same
political rights and duties. (2) Every German shall be equally eligible for any public office
according to his aptitude, qualifications and professional achievements. (3) Neither the
enjoyment of civil and political rights, nor eligibility for public office, nor rights acquired in the
public service shall be dependent upon religious affiliation. No one may be disadvantaged by
reason of adherence or non-adherence to a particular religious denomination or philosophical
creed.
97. First Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶¶ 1–15. For ease of reference, references
point to paragraph numbers found in the right-hand margin of the translation provided by the
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), however, as noted above, only the
German version is authoritative.
98. Id. ¶ 4.
99. In the course of its discussion, the Federal Constitutional Court noted, “Unlike the
crucifix, the headscarf was a not [an inherent] symbol of religion.” Id.
100. “Negative religious freedom” denotes the right to be free from any religious influence
in a state context. See id. ¶ 4. For example, see the Interdenominational School Case of 1975
(BVerfGE 41, BVerfGE 29) (upholding the constitutional validity of a Christian
interdenominational school in Baden-Würtemberg in the face of the argument put by parents
that their children should be protected from all religious influence at such a school. The courts
noted that the legislature must “choose a type of school which, insofar as it can influence
children’s decisions concerning faith and conscience, contains only a minimum of coercive
elements”); at 575.
102. Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶¶ 2–6.
103. Id.
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of the Muslim faith;” 104 the potential teacher’s “aptitude” for teaching
under the relevant law; 105 students’ inability to select teachers or to
avoid exposure to religious symbols of their own accord; 106 the state’s
duty to provide education under Article 7(1) of the Basic Law; 107 the
need to balance the interests of teachers and students in a practical way
(“practical concordance”); 108 the importance of “respectful [state]
neutrality;” 109 the irrelevance of any teacher-declaration of the
intention to avoid recruiting or proselytism; 110 the inability of primary
school pupils to “intellectually assimilate the religious motivation” of
a teacher’s actions; 111 and the role of the “class teacher” and the
inability for students to easily change classes or schools. 112
After numerous preliminary appeals, the Federal Administrative
Court decided, 113 “[t]he teacher’s right to conduct herself in accordance
with her religious conviction must have lower priority than the
conflicting freedom of faith of the pupils and parents during
104. The Federal Constitution Court noted, “considerable pressure to conform might arise
here; this would contradict the school’s pedagogical duty to work towards the integration of the
Muslim pupils.” Id. ¶ 5.
105. Specifically, §11.1 of the Baden-Württemberg Land Civil Service Act
(Landesbeamtengesetz Baden-Württemberg–LBG). In discussing aptitude, the Federal
Constitutional Court noted, “[t]he personal aptitude of teachers was in part to be determined on
the basis of how far they were in the position to put into practice the educational objectives laid
down under Article 7.1 of the Basic Law and to fulfill the state’s duty to provide education.” Id.
Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶ 85.
106. Id. ¶ 7.
107. Article 7(1) of the Basic Law provides: “The entire school system shall be under the
supervision of the state.” GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 7(1).
108. Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶ 9. Practical concordance (praktische
Konkordanz) represents a form of practical balancing when rights are in conflict.
109. “The duty of neutrality in ideology and religion imposed on the state by the Basic Law
was not a distancing and rejecting neutrality of the nature of laicist non-identification with
religions and ideologies, but a respectful neutrality, taking precautions for the future, which
imposed on the state a duty to safeguard a sphere of activity both for the individual and for
religious and ideological communities.” Id. ¶ 10. The court goes on to discuss the role of
“precautionary neutrality.” Id. ¶ 10.
110. Id. ¶ 11.
111. Id.
112. “An acceptable pragmatic solution of the conflict that allowed the complainant’s
freedom of belief to be taken more extensively into account was not possible in view of the
principle of the class teacher, which was predominant at the primary school and the non-selective
secondary school, and because of organisational difficulties with regard to moving from one
school or class to another.” Id. ¶ 11.
113. For instance, immediately prior to the appeal to and consideration by the Federal
Constitutional Court. Id. ¶ 8.
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lessons.” 114 The court noted, “freedom of faith was not guaranteed
without restriction” 115 and held:
In the context of secular compulsory schools, organized and
structured by the state, Article 4.1 of the Basic Law as a guarantee
of freedom benefited above all children required to attend school
and their parents. Here, the state was also obliged to take account
of the freedom of religion of the parents and the right of education
guaranteed to them under Article 6.2 sentence 1 of the Basic Law.
Children must be taught and educated in state compulsory schools
without any partiality on the part of the state and of the teachers
representing it in favor of Christian beliefs or of other religious
and ideological convictions. 116

The Federal Administrative Court also noted a change in
Germany’s religious and denominational landscape as follows:
With growing cultural and religious variety, where a growing
proportion of schoolchildren were uncommitted to any religious
denomination, the requirement of neutrality was becoming more
and more important, and it should not, for example, be relaxed on
the basis that the cultural, ethnic and religious variety in Germany
now characterized life at school too. 117

Both the Federal Government and the state of BadenWürttemberg presented arguments. The former argued that there is no
‘right’ to hold public office, 118 and that decisions on employment were
made on the basis of the requirements of the post and the personality
of the applicant. In the case of a teacher, this included “the ability and
the readiness of the teacher to comply with the official duties arising
from the status of a civil servant under the concrete conditions of
working at school.” 119 In discussing this argument, the Court also noted
Article 33(5) of the Basic Law, which allows for some limitations on
basic rights of those who are engaged as civil servants, and in
particular, that they carry out their duties neutrally and with

114. Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶ 15.
115. Id. ¶ 13.
116. Id.
117. Federal Administrative Court as characterized by the Federal Constitutional Court in
the Second Headscarf Decision. Id. ¶ 13.
118. I.e., no right could be grounded on the wording of Article 33(2) of the Basic Law. Id.
¶ 21.
119. Id.
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objectivity. 120 The Federal Government also referred to the possibility
that “the teacher’s conspicuous outer appearance might have a longterm detrimental influence on the peace at the school.” 121 This
reasoning relied on the Crucifix Case by contending that the ubiquity
and longevity of the exposure to the symbolic headwear was a “decisive
factor.” 122 Like the crucifix, the headscarf could not be avoided and
exposure to it was permanent and unavoidable. The complainant’s
symbolic act (of wearing) was also to be attributed not only to her but
to the state that she represented. The Federal Government was,
however, careful to avoid a secular understanding of such a line of
argument, insisting rather, “consideration was merely being given to
the growing importance of state neutrality in view of an increasing
number of religions in society.” 123
The arguments of the state of Baden-Württemberg centered on the
non-arbitrary nature of the decision of the Federal Administrative
Court. In doing so, they emphasized the rights of parents. Specifically:
account had to be taken of the fact that schoolchildren’s
personalities were not yet fully developed, and as a result school
children were particularly open to mental influences by persons in
authority, and in their developmental phase they learned in the first
instance by imitating the behavior of adults. In addition, in
particular in the case of children who have not reached the age at
which they can decide on religious matters themselves, the
parents’ right of education applies. 124

The court also drew on the concept of practical concordance
between the state duty to provide education and the rights of parents.
This, it was argued, is best achieved by “the state’s conducting itself

120. “The traditional fundamental principles of the permanent civil service laid down in
Article 33.5 of the Basic Law, which restricted the fundamental rights of civil servants, included
the obligation of teachers, who were civil servants, to carry out their duties objectively and
neutrally. This official duty also comprised the duty to carry out one’s duties neutrally from the
point of view of religion and ideology, respecting the viewpoints of pupils and parents.” Id. ¶
21.
121. Id. ¶ 22.
122. “Just as in the case of the crucifix in the classroom, the decisive factor with regard to
the Muslim headscarf was the fact that because of compulsory school attendance for all
children—unlike in the case of a brief encounter in everyday life—continuous confrontation
with a religious symbol could not be avoided.” Id. ¶ 23.
123. Id. ¶ 23.
124. Id. ¶ 25.

186

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1

neutrally in religious and ideological matters.” 125 This “attained all the
more importance the more diverse the religions in society,” and “[t]he
state’s neutrality must be shown in the person of the teacher.”126
Furthermore, “[t]he Federal Administrative Court had not introduced
an altered concept of neutrality, but merely accorded a growing
importance to the requirement of neutrality in a society that was
pluralist from the point of view of religion.” 127
The Federal Constitutional Court took up the matter in 2003,
deciding that the teacher’s “constitutional complaint is admissible and
is well-founded.” 128 In the course of the Court’s judgment, several
important principles were stated:
• Article 4 of the Basic Law “extends not only to the inner
freedom to believe or not to believe but also to the outer
freedom to express and disseminate the belief.” 129
• Such right “includes the individual’s right to orientate his or
her whole conduct to the teachings of his or her faith and to act
in accordance with his or her inner religious convictions.” 130
• Also, “[t]his relates not only to imperative religious doctrines,
but also to religious convictions according to which a way of
behavior is the correct one to deal with a situation in life.” 131
• In addition, “[t]he freedom of faith guaranteed in Article 4.1
and 4.2 of the Basic Law is guaranteed unconditionally.
Restrictions must therefore be contained in the constitution
itself.” 132
The School Board’s decision to reject the complainant’s
application to teach was held contrary to the Basic Law. 133 It was
deemed unconstitutional. 134 In practical terms, however, her “success”
was tempered by the reasoning that surrounded the state legislative
powers over school clothing. Essentially, while the German states
(Länder) have broad powers over schools, the state’s civil service law
125. Id. ¶ 26.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. ¶ 29.
129. Id. ¶ 37.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. ¶ 38.
133. BvR 1436/02, at 1.
134. Id.
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(Landesbeamtengesetz) contained no provision that could reasonably
justify a ban on headscarves. This lacuna led to a rapid revision of state
laws. By June 2006, eight of the sixteen German states had opened the
way for an effective ban on wearing the headscarf in state schools.135
Some commentators have noted that this was an effective transfer of
the final decision from the judiciary to the legislature. 136
2. The Second Headscarf Decision
The Second Headscarf Decision extended the jurisprudence of the
First Headscarf Decision. In the words of Matthias Mahlmann, “[i]t
decided that an abstract ban on headscarves and other visible religious
symbols for teachers at a state school is not compatible with the
Constitution because it is disproportionate.” 137 The Court left open the
possibility of a ban in cases where there was a “sufficiently specific
danger” to the peace of the school or the neutrality of the state.138 The
Court also noted that such a ban was possible, saying, “over a region
or possibly even over an entire Land (state) . . . with regard to
interdenominational state schools, [but] only if there is a sufficiently
specific danger to the aforementioned legal interests throughout the
area to which the prohibition applies.” 139 The case also raises serious
issues of process, as well as questions about the rights of students as
measured against those of teachers. 140
135. Some authors have divided this into three models: “exclusive Christian,” “strict
neutrality,” and “open neutrality.” See Christian Henkes & Sascha Kneip, Die Plenardebatten
um das Kopftuch in den Deutschen Landesparlamenten [Plenary Debates in the German State
Parliments], in DER STOFF AUS DEM KONFLIKTE SIND: DEBATTEN UM DAS KOPFTUCH IN
DEUTSCHLAND, ÖSTERREICH UND DER SCHWEIZ [THE STUFF OF CONFLICT: HEADSCARF
DEBATES IN GERMANY, AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND] 249–74 (Sabine Berghahn & Petra
Rostock eds., 2015). See also the 2009 Bielefeldt Transcript, cited in Stephanie Sinclair, More
Than Just a Piece of Cloth: The German “Headscarf” Debate, 16 IMPLICIT RELIGION 483, 486
(2013).
136. See Seyla Benhabib et al., The Return of Political Theology: The Scarf Affair in
Comparative Constitutional Perspective in France, Germany and Turkey, 36 PHIL. & SOC.
CRITICISM 451, 460 (2010).
137. Matthias Mahlmann, Religious Symbolism and the Resilience of Liberal
Constitutionalism: On the Federal German Constitutional Court’s Second Headscarf Decision,
16 GERMAN L. J. 887, 891-92 (2015).
138. Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶ 80.
139. Id.
140. G. Taylor, Teachers’ Religious Headscarves in German Constitutional Law, 6 OX. J.
LAW RELIGION 10, 93 (2017) (arguing, inter alia, that “[m]uch more attention needed to be paid
to the needs of the pupils in the specific context in which they find themselves: people in a very
vulnerable stage of life compelled by law regularly to attend an institution which is crucial for
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Seminal to the Second Headscarf Decision, the Federal
Constitutional Court interpreted the right to religious freedom and
conscience as follows:
In its section 1, Art. 4 GG guarantees the freedom of faith and of
conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or ideological
belief; in section 2 it guarantees the right to the undisturbed
practice of religion. The two sections of Art. 4 GG contain a single
fundamental right that is to be understood as all-encompassing
(citation omitted). It extends not only to the inner freedom to
believe or not to believe—i.e., to have a faith, to keep it secret, to
renounce a former faith, and to turn to a new one—but also the
outer freedom to profess and disseminate one’s faith, to promote
one’s faith and to proselytise (citation omitted). Therefore, it
includes not only acts of worship and the practice and observance
of religious customs, but also religious instruction and other forms
of expression of religious and ideological life (citation omitted).
This also includes the right of individuals to align their entire
conduct with the teachings of their faith, and to act in accordance
with this conviction, and thus to live a life guided by faith; and this
applies to more than just imperative religious doctrines (citation
omitted).” 141

This is a comprehensive definition, and notably includes a right
for the religion/person to proselytize, and to align one’s “entire conduct
with the teachings of their faith.” The court continues:
When assessing what qualifies as an act of practising a religion or
an ideological belief in a given case, one must not disregard what
conception the religious or ideological communities concerned,
and the individual holder of the fundamental right, have of
themselves (citation omitted). However, this does not mean that
all conduct by a person must be viewed as an expression of
freedom of faith in the same way that the person views it
subjectively. The authorities may analyse and decide whether it
has been sufficiently substantiated, both in terms of its spiritual
content and its outer appearance, that the conduct can in fact
plausibly be attributed to the scope of application of Art. 4 GG; in
other words, that it does in fact have a motivation that is to be
their personal and psychological as well as intellectual development. This is particularly so when
we are talking about Muslim girls, who constitute a minority that faces challenges with adapting
to its societal surroundings”).
141. Second Headscarf Decision, supra note 86, ¶ 85.
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viewed as religious. However, the state may not judge its citizens’
religious convictions, let alone designate them as “right” or
“wrong.” This is especially the case when divergent views on such
points are advanced within a religion (citation omitted). 142

The court noted that the female Muslim complainants in the case
maintained a religious reason for wearing their headwear and
concluded they were doing so as an “imperative religious duty, and as
a fundamental component of an [Islamic] lifestyle.” 143 This was held
to be so despite the fact that “the exact content of the rules of female
clothing is indeed in dispute among Islamic scholars.” 144 The court next
held that the prohibition on wearing headscarves was “a serious
interference with [the complainants’] fundamental right of freedom of
faith and freedom to profess a belief.” 145 It also notes that a “headscarf,
specifically, is not as such a religious symbol,” 146 and goes on to make
a comparison with the Christian cross, which is more inherently
representative of Christianity than is the headscarf of Islam. It is useful
to quote this section in its entirety:
A headscarf, specifically, is not as such a religious symbol. It can
exert a comparable effect only in combination with other factors
(citation omitted) To that extent, for example, it differs from the
Christian cross (citation omitted). Even if an Islamic headscarf
serves only to fulfil a religious requirement and the wearer does
not attribute symbolic character to it, and merely views it as an
article of clothing prescribed by her religion, this does not change
the fact that, depending on social context, it is widely interpreted
as a reference to the wearer’s adherence to the Muslim faith. In
that sense, it is an article of clothing with religious connotations.
If it is understood as an outer indication of religious identity, it has
the effect of an expression of a religious conviction without any
need for a specific intent to make this known or any additional
conduct to reinforce such an effect. The wearer of a headscarf tied
in a typical way will usually also be aware of this. Depending on
the circumstances of the individual case, this effect may also occur
for other forms of coverings for the head and neck. 147

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. ¶ 86.
Id. ¶ 88.
Id. ¶ 89.
Id. ¶ 90.
Id. ¶ 94.
Id.
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The unique nature of ‘symbolic meaning’ for the religious
observer is well-highlighted in this passage. Such symbolic meanings
are usually assumed to be protected in broad terms in some form of
constitutional guarantee in most democracies. In Australia, this turns
out to be much more honored in political rhetoric than in law. In the
startling assessment of Paul Babie and James Krumrey-Quinn:
In Australia, citizens may believe that they too enjoy limitations
on the ability of government to infringe upon their exercise of
religious autonomy or right to display symbols of those
connections that matter deeply to them. Such a belief is erroneous.
In fact, Australia remains the only western liberal democracy
without a constitutional or legislative protection of fundamental
rights and freedoms. 148

We now turn to these issues in more detail. It is convenient to
begin with an overview of conscience protection afforded citizens in
Australia. Thereafter follows an analysis of the laws surrounding
crucifixes and religious clothing.
VI. CONSCIENCE PROTECTION IN AUSTRALIA—SOME
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS
According to Christopher Soper’s work on pluralism in six
democracies, 149 Germany is to be grouped with England as a country
that applies an ‘establishment’ model to church-state relations.150
Meanwhile, Australia is grouped with the Netherlands as applying a
pluralist model, and the United States and France are held up as models
of “separation.” 151 Australia and the Netherlands are further divided on

148. Paul Babie & James Krumrey-Quinn, The Protection of Religious Freedom in
Australia: A Comparative Assessment of Autonomy and Symbols, in REASONING RIGHTS:
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT 259, 278 (Liora Lazarus et al. eds., 2014). Babie and
Krumrey-Quinn do acknowledge, however, a “minimal patchwork of constitutional, legislative
and common law provisions differing not only in their applications to the Commonwealth, State
and Territory governments in the Australian federation, but also in the scope and strength of
protection afforded,” at 259.
149. MANSMA & SOPER, supra note 24.
150. Id. Under Part III: Models of Establishment, Chapter 6 is devoted to England and
Chapter 7 is devoted to Germany.
151. Id. Under Part II: Models of Pluralism, Chapter 4 is devoted to the Netherlands and
Chapter 5 is devoted to Australia. Under Part I: Models of Separation, Chapter 2 is devoted to
the United States and chapter 3 is devoted to France.
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the basis that the Netherlands brand of pluralism is “principled” and
that of Australia is “pragmatic.” 152
As previously stated, Australia has more limited case law on the
question of religious freedom, and likewise, on the more focused topic
of conscience protection. Major cases decided at the highest level of
consideration, the High Court of Australia, are rare. This is probably in
keeping with the politically pragmatic approach to such issues, 153 as
well as a less active resort to rights protection via litigation, 154 and the
already narrow approach to section 116 of the Australian Constitution.
Section 116 provides as follows:
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test
shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust
under the Commonwealth. 155

The Ruddock Review notes the following limitations on this
section:
First, it is a limitation on the legislative power of the
Commonwealth only. The States are not limited by its terms.
Whether the Territories are restricted by section 116 has been
considered by the High Court on a number of occasions but the
position remains unclear. Second, section 116 is a limitation on
Commonwealth legislative power; it does not create a ‘right’ for
individuals to hold or manifest their faith. Nor does it create a
positive obligation on the Commonwealth to do anything to ensure
freedom of religion. 156

These limitations have been narrowly interpreted such that “[a] law will
only fall foul of the ‘free exercise’ limb of section 116, for example, if
its purpose is to restrict religious practice, even if its effect is to burden
152. Soper asserts, “the most important principles in church-state relations in Australia are
pragmatism and tolerance.” He goes on to argue that this had changed over time, stating,
“Australia has vacillated among four different church-state models in its two-hundred-year
history: establishment, plural establishment, liberal separationism, and pragmatic pluralism.” Id.
at 121.
153. Id.
154. The fewer constitutional rights available to litigate may mean few lawsuits but suits
filed does not necessarily reflect the level of concern in the community, especially when the
rights of minorities are in issue.
155. Australian Constitution S 116.
156. Ruddock Review, supra note 1, ¶ 1.90.
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disproportionately the practices of a particular religion.” 157 Only one
Australian State Constitution–that of Tasmania–contains constitutional
protection for religion and conscience, 158 and this provision has also
been narrowly construed. 159 There is little else at the federal,160 and
little at the constitutional level of any Australian State or Territory, that
is protective of conscience or religion. 161 There are, however, a large
number of lower-level (i.e. ordinary) statutes which deal, in a
fragmentary fashion, with vilification, discrimination, and in some

157. Id. at 1.91.
158. See section 46 of the Constitution Act 1934 (Tasmania) which provides: “(1) Freedom of
conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and
morality, guaranteed to every citizen. (2) No person shall be subject to any disability, or be
required to take any oath on account of his religion or religious belief and no religious test shall
be imposed in respect of the appointment to or holding of any public office.”
159. Id. See Ruddock Review, supra note 1, ¶ 1.94-95 (noting that section 46 of the
Constitutional Act 1934 (Tasmania) has not been subject of judicial consideration and that recent
comments of Tracey J. in the case of Corneloup v Launceston City Council [2016] FCA 974
suggest it section 46 may be of limited scope and “does not, in terms, confer any personal rights
or freedoms on citizens.” Corneloup v Launceston City Council [2016] FCA 974, 38.
160. Defence Act 1903 s 61A provides that the following persons are exempt from service
in the Defence Force in time of war:
…
(d) ministers of religion;
(e) members of a religious order who devote the whole of their time to the duties of the
order;
(f) persons who are students at a college maintained solely for training persons to become
members of a religious order;
(g) persons who are students at a theological college as defined by the regulations or are
theological students as prescribed;
(h) persons whose conscientious beliefs do not allow them to participate in war or warlike
operations;
(i) persons whose conscientious beliefs do not allow them to participate in a particular war
or particular warlike operations; and
(1A) Persons whose conscientious beliefs do not allow them to engage in duties of a
combatant nature (either generally or during a particular war or particular warlike operations)
are not exempt from liability to serve in the Defense Force in time of war but are exempt from
such duties while members of the Defense Force as long as those beliefs continue.
Defence
Act
1903 s
61A,
available
at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/da190356/s61a.html [https://perma.cc/2EUJ-JZD3].
161. See, e.g., Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) as discussed in EVANS, supra note 26, at 98ff.
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cases the education of children. 162 These statutes lie beyond the scope
of this study. 163
A. Crucifix Laws in Australia
Religious objects (e.g., a crucifix) are regularly placed in
classrooms in religious schools in Australia. 164 There is usually no such
placement in government (public) schools, and to the author’s
knowledge, there are no decided cases on the issue.
In comparing the situation in Australia with that in Italy (as
decided in the Lautsi decision), 165 Babie and Krumrey-Quinn have
argued and concluded that “[a]s in Lautsi, crucifixes would also be left
to hang in Australian public schools.” 166 As has been demonstrated, the
situation in Germany is quite different and gives highlight to a number
of comparative points.
First, the German analysis relies on constitutionalized freedom of
religion, for which there is no equivalent in Australia or at least none
that has been interpreted in the same way as Germany’s. Second, the
Australian courts may consider the hung crucifix as a religious custom
(observance), thus falling directly within the scope of Section 116 of
the Australian Constitution. This, however, is not irrefutably certain
since, as Babie and Krumrey-Quinn also note:
the mere presence of the students in the classroom is unlikely to
constitute a religious observance carried out by the students as
162. See, e.g., Education Act 1990 (NSW) s 32 (“Section 32 Special religious education:
(1) In every government school, time is to be allowed for the religious education of children of
any religious persuasion, but the total number of hours so allowed in a year is not to exceed, for
each child, the number of school weeks in the year”). According to s 32(2) special religious
education “is to be given by a member of the clergy or other religious teacher of that persuasion
authorised by the religious body to which the member of the clergy or other religious teacher
belongs.” Education Act 1990 (NSW) s 32, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ea1990104/s32.html [https://perma.cc/9J62-QKUT].
163. See the comprehensive lists in Appendix C of the Ruddock Review, supra note 1, at
128-29. See generally chapters 6 and 7 of EVANS, supra note 26.
164. See, e.g., Bishops of N.S.W. & the Austl. Cap. Terr., Catholic Schools at a
Crossroads: Pastoral Letter of the Bishops of NSW and the ACT, CATHOLIC SCHOOLS NSW 10
(Aug. 8, 2007), https://www.csnsw.catholic.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/catholicschools-at-a-crossroads.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TWY-B9M8] (affirming that Catholic schools
“are places cultivating a Catholic imagination, where prayer and liturgy are supported by a
Catholic visual culture, including crucifixes and pictures of Our Lady and the saints”).
165. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 18, 63 (2011).
166. Babie & Krumrey-Quinn, supra note 148, at 272.
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there is no custom associated with this action. That there is, for
example, no required veneration of the symbol by the members of
the class upon entrance to the classroom, leaves application of the
clause ambiguous. 167

In Germany, the (successful) arguments about “learning under the
cross” are relevant here. Australian courtrooms do not contain
crucifixes, 168 although witnesses typically swear on a Bible, and oaths
of affirmation are also legally available. 169 Some aspects of the Bible
oath are regulated in a positive and negative way (e.g., holding in the
hand is required—if feasible—but kissing is not required). 170 This
includes the form of words used, 171 and the placement of the swearing
hand, 172 amongst other things.
There has been a recent call by a Magistrate in the State of
Victoria for Bibles to be removed from all courtrooms in Victoria on
the basis that they are “relics from another time and like the gavel, the
wig, and the quill and ink, they belong in a museum, not a modern
court.” 173 Given Bibles may be, and often are used by witnesses in oathtaking, it is not clear exactly what was being requested and the
suggestion that they be entirely removed remains a curious one.
Because the placing of crucifixes on walls of Australian public
schools has never been a political issue, and those in religious schools
167. Id.
168. The author has not been able to uncover any examples of this, although the written
and pictorial record remains open.
169. See, e.g., in the state of NSW, Oaths Act 1900 No 20 (NSW) s 11A.
170. See id. Section 11A(1) provides, “Any person taking any oath on the Bible or on the
New Testament, or the Old Testament, for any purpose whatsoever, whether in judicial
proceedings or otherwise, shall, if physically capable of doing so, hold a copy of the Bible or
Testament in his or her hand, but it shall not be necessary for the person to kiss such copy by
way of assent.” Id.
171. See id. Section 11A(2) provides, “The officer administering the oath may repeat the
appropriate form of adjuration, and the person taking the oath shall thereupon, while holding in
his or her hand a copy of the Bible, New Testament, or Old Testament, indicate his or her assent
to the oath so administered by uttering the words ‘So help me, God[.]’” Id. Section 11A(3)
provides, “The person taking the oath may, while holding in his or her hand a copy of the Bible,
New Testament, or Old Testament, repeat the words of the oath as prescribed or allowed by
law.” Id.
172. See id. Section 11A(5) provides, “Provided that any witness in any judicial
proceeding may swear with up-lifted hand in the following manner and form: The witness with
uplifted hand says—I swear by Almighty God as I shall answer to God at the Great Day of
Judgment that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” Id.
173. See Genevieve Alison, Call to Cut Bibles Out of Court, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr.
23, 2019, at 9.
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are placed regularly and without comment, there would appear to be no
case law that may offer a ready comparison with the German saga that
has unfolded there in recent decades. Religious clothing in the
Australian courtroom, however, is increasingly an issue and has been
prominent in recent cases, to which we now turn.
B. Religious Clothing in Australia
Cases on wearing religious clothing in Australia, including
schools and courtrooms, are rare. Several cases have been decided
based on one-off regulations in schools as well as courtrooms. 174 There
has also been some confected controversy over the wearing of the
Burka in the Federal Parliament, 175 but this was resolved in favor of a
“no dress code” approach. 176
In the school context, David Furse-Roberts has argued that any
such regulation should take careful note of Australia’s common law
traditions as well as international obligations, but that the most critical
factor is the avoidance of “a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to both
government and non-governments schools [which] could actually
militate against religious freedom, particularly in circumstances where
faith-based schools wish to enact their own uniform policies pursuant
to their religious convictions.” 177 An example of the legal problems
raised by a one-size-fits-all approach occurred in a 2017 case from the
174. See Arora v. Melton Christian College (Human Rights) [2017] VCAT 1507. See also
Elzahed v. State of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 103 (18 May 2018), both discussed below.
175. See Avi Selk, An Australian Senator Wore a Burqa in Parliament—Then Called for
a Ban on Muslim Immigrants, WASH. POST: WORLDVIEWS (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/17/an-australian-senatorwore-a-burqa-in-parliament-then-called-for-a-ban-on-muslimimmigrants/?utm_term=.90d95efa26dd [https://perma.cc/U88Q-M4W8].
176. See Guides to Senate Procedure, No. 23 - Provisions governing the conduct of
senators
in
debate,
PARLIAMENT
OF
AUSTL.,
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Brief_Guid
es_to_Senate_Procedure/No_23 [https://perma.cc/4MLJ-QDR4] (last visited Mar. 27, 2019)
(“15. Dress. There are no formal dress rules in the standing orders and the matter of dress is left
to the judgment of senators, subject to any ruling by the President. Advisers are also expected
to maintain appropriate standards of dress, but a resolution of the Senate indicates that advisers
and media representatives are no longer required to wear coats”).
177. See David Furse-Roberts, Religious Freedom in the Playground: Public Policy and
the Wearing of Religious Attire in Australian Schools, AUSTRALIAN POL’Y & HIST. (Nov. 12,
2017), http://aph.org.au/religious-freedom-in-the-playground-public-policy-and-the-wearingof-religious-attire-in-australian-schools/ [https://perma.cc/2J6L-W8HB] (last visited Apr. 24,
2019).
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state of Victoria, which concerned the wearing of a patka 178 by a Sikh
boy. 179 A Christian school banned the clothing on the basis of a
declared uniform policy, which sought to promote, amongst other
things, “uniformity, inclusivity, and protection from inadvertent
discrimination.” 180 This was held to be a breach of the state’s Equal
Opportunity Act (2010). 181 In commenting on the case, Barker has
noted the similarity with the notable UK House of Lords decision of
Begum, R (on the application of) v. Denbigh High School in 2006,182
and “[t]he problem with neutrality is that it tends only to in fact be
neutral for the majority. It is only those from minority groups that are
asked to compromise. Equality does not always equal equity.” 183
At least one state government, New South Wales, (“NSW”) has
indicated that students have positive rights to wear religious clothing
and “ruled that students could not be suspended for doing so.” 184 The
fact that most Australian schools already regulate clothing in the form
of an official ‘school uniform’ may weigh against any further
legislation in this area. 185
178. See generally Renae Barker, School Uniform Policies Need to Accommodate Students’
Cultural
Practices,
Topics,
SBS
NEWS:
VOICES
(July
27,
2017),
https://www.sbs.com.au/topics/life/culture/article/2017/07/27/school-uniform-policies-needaccommodate-students-cultural-practices [https://perma.cc/TJ5B-ZBTM] (“The patka is a
smaller version of the turban, or dastar, worn by most Sikh men. It is an important article of
faith. It therefore forms an important part of a Sikh child’s identity. It is not simply a piece of
clothing”).
179. Arora v Melton Christian College [2017] VCAT 1507 (Austl.).
180. Id. at 59, 66, 84, 86, 97.
181. Section 38(1), of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) (the “EO Act”) provides, “An
educational authority must not discriminate against a person—(a) in deciding who should be
admitted as a student; or (b) by refusing, or failing to accept, the person’s application for
admission as a student; or (c) in the terms on which the authority admits the person as a student.”
182. Begum, R (on the application of) v Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 (appeal
taken from EWCA Civ) (UK) (concerning alternative forms of dress available to female students
in a Muslim school).
183. Barker, supra note 178; see the suggestions of Benson, supra note 24, at 11 (referring
to the need to focus on “unjust discrimination” not just “discrimination” together with “a
presumption in favour of diversity”).
184. David Furse-Roberts, Religious Freedom in the Playground: Public Policy and the
Wearing of Religious Attire in Australian Schools, APH ESSAYS (NOV. 12, 2017),
http://aph.org.au/religious-freedom-in-the-playground-public-policy-and-the-wearing-ofreligious-attire-in-australian-schools/ [https://perma.cc/MZE7-Y7K9].
185. This regulation derives its authority from the relevant State education department or–
in the case of a private school–the school itself. Consequences for failure to wear the required
uniform vary. For a discussion of the recent history of uniforms, see William McKeith, School
uniforms: who needs them?, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 13, 2017),
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In the area of general law enforcement, at least two Australian
states have made changes to the laws of personal identification (mainly
for the purposes of police patrols). Thus, in 2011, NSW introduced
changes to the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act
2002, which made it easier for police to identify persons in, for
example, routine traffic stops, or for the purpose of driver’s license
production during a random breath test for alcohol. 186 In a lengthy
report given in August 2013 by the NSW Ombudsman, 187 the changes
were seen as mostly successful but with the recommendation that, in
deference to cultural sensitivities, such identification would run more
smoothly if female police officers were available for such activities.188
Identification laws raise other issues, one of which is worth
pursuing briefly here. The NSW law discussed above also stipulated
that failing to comply with a request for identification carried possible
https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/the-case-for-dropping-school-uniforms-altogether20170913-gygmt8.html [https://perma.cc/PVC4-FAMF].
186. See Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) pt 3 div 4
(Austl.) [hereinafter LEPRA].
187. A position authorized by Statute, the NSW Ombudsman describes his role as “to
safeguard the community in their dealings with government and non-government agencies that
fall within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. This is done in many ways—by responding to
enquiries, investigating complaints, initiating investigations, monitoring compliance with the
law, auditing administrative conduct, monitoring how organizations handle issues that have been
notified or referred to the office, and promoting good administration, transparency, and
responsive complaint handling. The Ombudsman is independent of the government agencies and
persons it deals with and investigates.” Michael Barnes, Ombudsman’s Message, OMBUDSMAN
NEW SOUTH WALES, https://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/what-we-do/about-us/ombudsmansmessage [https://perma.cc/F3LN-TZTZ] (last visited Apr. 27, 2019).
188. Bruce Barbour & New South Wales Office of the Ombudsman, Review of Division
4, Part 3, of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002: face coverings and
identification,
OBMUDSMAN
NEW
SOUTH
WALES
(Aug.
2013),
http://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/11372/Review-of-Divison-4,-Part3-of-the-Law-Enforcement-Powers-and-Responsbilities-Act-2002-face-coverings-andidentification.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9G2-5YCA]. In summary, the Ombudsman opined, “the
recommendations we have made centre on making it a lawful requirement that a female officer
be made available, only where requested and where practicable, to look at the face of any woman
wearing a face covering for religious reasons. We also recommend that police be given further
guidance to help them handle situations where they need to identify a person whose face is
covered. In particular, practical information about how privacy can be afforded in the situations
where the law is currently most commonly used—identifying female drivers in traffic matters—
would be most useful for traffic and general duties officers who patrol in key locations in
metropolitan Sydney. Focusing on police officers is not enough, however, particularly as
individual officers may only need to use the powers occasionally. It is also important that women
who wear a niqab and the wider Muslim community have a greater understanding about the new
law.” Id. at iii.
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punishment, but this is itself fraught with the same identification
problem. In the words of the NSW Ombudsman:
[I]f the officer decides to penalise the person for committing the
offence of refusing to comply with the requirement, the officer will
then be faced with a somewhat circular dilemma, as they need to
issue an infringement or court attendance notice but cannot
confirm to whom they should address the notice. In practice, if the
person has given them a driver licence, the officer could address
the notice to the licence holder. However, this does carry the
possibility that the penalty could be successfully challenged, on
the basis that the person who committed the offence was not the
licence holder . . . Because of this, the only option at this point may
be to arrest the person, even though he or she may not have
committed any other offence, or the other offence is minor (for
example, to do with a traffic matter). 189

This issue would rarely arise. It does, however, show the
complexities that can arise in identification scenarios where cultural
expertise is deficient, and both sides are struggling to understand one
another. In the end, the law must address such problems as best it
can. 190
In the employment context, there is generally no specific law at
federal or state levels dealing with religious clothing in the
workplace. 191 However, a variegated web of federal and state laws and
regulations covers a range of potential conscience issues. 192 There have

189. Id. at 33.
190. For example, by additional warnings (although this may add even more impractical
complication), education of the religious rights of those wearing religious clothing, and cultural
education of law enforcement. The Ombudsman’s Report also discusses the question of
perceived differences between a police officer viewing the picture of a face on a driver’s license,
and viewing the face itself; see id. at 37.
191. There is, however, a general provision in the laws of the state of South Australia
which allows for an exemption to non-discrimination laws in circumstances where reasonable
face recognition is required. “This Part does not apply to discrimination on the ground of
religious appearance or dress if the discrimination arises as a consequence of a person refusing
to reveal his or her face in circumstances in which the person has been requested to do so for the
purpose of verifying the identity of the person, and the request was reasonable in the
circumstances.” South Australia Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s 85ZN (Austl.), available at
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/EQUAL%20OPPORTUNITY%20ACT%201984/C
URRENT/1984.95.AUTH.PDF [https://perma.cc/5XAX-GXWY] (last visited Apr. 27, 2019).
192. See Joan Squelch, Religious Symbols and Clothing in the Workplace: Balancing the
Respective Rights of Employees and Employers, 20 MURDOCH U. L. REV. 38–57 (2013).
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been two superior court cases, albeit none at the highest level,193
dealing with religious clothing worn in an Australian courtroom, to
which we now turn. 194
1. The Elzahed Case—The Case of the Plaintiff/Witness
The highest-level reported case dealing with religious
headscarves in Australia is the New South Wales Court of Appeal
decision in Elzahed v. State of New South Wales. 195 Despite its narrow
focus, the decision is an interesting one and worth detailed
consideration.
Moutia Elzahed (“Elzahed)” was the subject of a police raid
during 2014, in which she alleged assault and battery by the police.196
This allegation resulted in a trial, in which Elzahed would only give
evidence “with her entire face, other than her eyes, covered by a veil
known as a niqab.” 197 The decision on whether to permit evidence to
be given in such a way was entirely a matter for the judge and was
governed by the laws relating to judicial discretion under the wellknown case of House v. The King. 198 The district court judge took the
arguments of both sides into account and “accepted the need to take
into account the appellant’s religious beliefs,” [and] stated, “[o]n the
other hand, I must take into account whether I would be impeded in my
ability to fully assess the reliability and credibility of the evidence . . .

193. The highest appellate court in Australia is the High Court of Australia. Australian
Constitution s 71.
194. While not specifically religious in nature, the case of Ellenbogen v. Cullen is worth
noting in the context of courtroom clothing (where the court held that wearing a headband, which
bore the colors of the Aboriginal flag, does not amount to contempt of court). Ellenbogen v
Cullen (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Smart J, 30 July 1990) (Austl.),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.nt.gov.au/doc/judgements/2002/0/20020206NTSC10.htm
[https://perma.cc/HKM9-X3Z5].
195. Elzahed v State of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 103 (Austl.), available at
https://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/decision/5afb85c7e4b074a7c6e1f411
[https://perma.cc/PR5G-92ZC] [hereinafter Elzahed Appeal]. This case was an appeal from the
decision of Balla DCJ in Moutia Elzahed & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia and State of New
South Wales [2016] NSWSC 327; see also the decision of Moutia Elzahed & Ors v
Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW [2017] NSWDC 160 (dealing with the question
of court costs).
196. Elzahed Appeal, NSWCA 103 ¶ 10.
197. Id. ¶ 1.
198. House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 (Austl.).
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if I am not afforded the opportunity of being able to see her face when
she gives evidence.” 199
The appeal court upheld the decision of the trial judge to refuse
the giving of evidence wearing a full veil. 200 In the course of the
judgment, the court of appeal discussed an Explanatory Note on the
Judicial Process and Participation of Muslims, 201 which stated that “it
is not contrary to Sharia law for a woman to uncover her face when
giving evidence in court.” 202
Cases from other countries, in which the wearing of a niqab was
considered and treated “a little differently,” were cited but not
considered persuasive by NSW the appeals court. 203 While Australia’s
highest court had not considered this specific issue, it had issued clear
statements about “witness demeanor” and in a 2003 decision had noted:
[I]n recent years judges have become more aware of scientific
research that has cast doubt on the ability of judges (or anyone
else) to tell truth from falsehood accurately on the basis of
demeanor. Considerations such as these have encouraged judges,
both at trial and on appeal, to limit their reliance on the
appearances of witnesses and to reason to their conclusions, as far
as possible, on the basis of contemporary materials, objectively
established facts and the apparent logic of events. This does not
eliminate the “established principles about witness credibility”;
but it tends to reduce the occasions where those principles are seen
as critical. 204

The “established principles about witness credibility” included,
by implication, the ability to see the witness’ face free of clothing in
the interests of trial that is fair to both parties. The Court of Appeal also
made clear that in deciding to uphold the trial judge’s ruling on giving
evidence with an uncovered face, they were not making a general ruling
with “wider implications for a group of women in Australia of Islamic
199. Elzahed Appeal, NSWCA 103, ¶ 32.
200. Id. ¶ 70.
201. Australian National Imams Council, Explanatory Note on the Judicial Process and
Participation of Muslims, DISPUTES CENTRE (Dec. 12, 2017), https://disputescentre.com.au/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/PUBLIC-STATEMENT-Explanatory-Note-on-the-Judicial-Processand-Participation-of-Muslims.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MNY-65ZA].
202. See Elzahed Appeal, NSWCA 103.
203. Id. ¶ 44. The cited cases were: Police v. Razamjoo [2005] DCR 408 (N.Z.); R v. NS
[2012] 3 SCR 726 (Can.) and The Queen v. D (R) [2013] EW Misc 13 (CC) (Eng.).
204. Elzahed Appeal, NSWCA 103, ¶ 46 (citing the High Court of Australia (HCA) in Fox
v. Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118).
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faith.” 205 The court also quoted with approval a recent article on this
topic, which stated, “while . . . there are circumstances where a woman
may appear in court with her face covered, in all of the cases considered
in this article the witness has ultimately been ordered to remove her
veil in order to give evidence.” 206 Scholarly work covering five
common law jurisdictions has confirmed this now appears to be the
general approach. 207 This is borne out somewhat in the next case.
2. The Chaarani Case—The Case of the Courtroom Spectator
The second case concerning courtroom clothing, The Queen v.
Chaarani, 208 was heard before a single judge in the Supreme Court of
Victoria. That case concerned the trial of the husband of Aisha Al
Qattan (hereafter “Ms. Al Qattan”) on charges related to the preparation
of a terrorist attack. 209 Ms. Al Qattan wished to be present in the
courtroom’s public gallery to support her husband and was required to
remove her religious clothing, a nikab, 210 for that purpose. The written
judgment records nine arguments in favor of wearing the nikab in the
gallery, all of which were rejected. 211 The first argument centered upon
religious freedom asserting, “Ms. Al Qattan has a strong religious
belief that she should wear the nikab in public. It is a ‘fundamental way
in which she observes her faith.’” 212 While conceding that Ms. Al
Qattan’s beliefs were religious and were strongly held, the judge was
persuaded that security concerns, including the possibility that a
spectator might do (rare) or say (less rare) inappropriate things in the
courtroom, should prevail. 213 The possibility was also canvassed that
205. Id. ¶ 63.
206. Id. ¶ 65 citing Renae Barker, Burqas and Niqabs in the Courtroom: Finding Practical
Solutions, 91 AUSTRALIAN L. J. 225, 226 (2017).
207. Barker, supra note 178, at 40 (on religious apparel and appearance in court in
Australia). See EVANS, supra note 26, at 202–08.
208. The Queen v. Chaarani (Ruling 1) [2018] VSC 387 (Austl.), available at
http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/viewdoc/au/cases/vic/VSC/2018/387.html?context=1;query=chaarani;mask_path=au/cases
/vic/VSC [https://perma.cc/RS9Z-DDPW] (last visited Apr. 27, 2019).
209. Id. ¶ 1.
210. There was some discussion of the correct spelling of this term. The Judge commented
on his use of the spelling as ‘nikab’ rather than ‘niqab’ as follows: “‘Nikab’ is sometimes spelt
‘niqab.’ I have taken the former spelling from the Explanatory Note on the Judicial Process and
Participation of Muslims.” Elzahed Appeal, NSWCA 103, ¶ 44.
211. Id. ¶ 27.
212. Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 3.
213. Id.
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more than one person could wear such clothing and that security
officials would thereby find it harder to identify an individual in the
gallery with multiple spectators, and to deter any possible future
offense. His honor explained
It is not good court management, in my view, to adopt a reactive
approach, that is, to allow spectators to have their faces covered
but eject them, and refuse them re-entry, if they are detected
misbehaving. First, prevention is better than cure. Second, it is
naïve to think that misbehavior will always be immediately
detected by court security staff. A person to whom something
improper is said or done may be too stunned or frightened to raise
the alarm immediately, enabling the culprit to get away. Or there
may not be sufficient court security staff on hand. Court security
resources are limited and one cannot always predict which cases
will generate problems in the public gallery. 214

The court also made several unambiguous references to religious
freedom. These included the following: “Open justice, religious
freedom and the right to participate in public life are fundamental
values that must be accorded full respect in our society and in this court.
But no one could sensibly claim that these principles and rights brook
no limitations.” 215
The court also referred to the state Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities Act 2006 (the “Charter”) which plainly recognizes the
rights of persons 216 to “religious freedom,” 217 and to “participation in
public life.” 218 Even though no evidence was put forward by the
214. Id. ¶ 23.
215. Id. ¶ 25.
216. “Person” is defined as “a human being.” See Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic.) s 3 (Austl.).
217. Id. s 14 (Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief: (1) Every person has
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, including (a) the freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his or her choice; and (b) the freedom to demonstrate his
or her religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching, either individually or as
part of a community, in public or in private. (2) A person must not be coerced or restrained in a
way that limits his or her freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice or teaching).
218. Id. s 18 (Taking part in public life: (1) Every person in Victoria has the right, and is
to have the opportunity, without discrimination, to participate in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Every eligible person has the right, and is
to have the opportunity, without discrimination—(a) to vote and be elected at periodic State and
municipal elections that guarantee the free expression of the will of the electors; and (b) to have
access, on general terms of equality, to the Victorian public service and public office).
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lawyers for Ms. Al Qattan as to the religious motivations for her desire
to wear the nikab, 219 the court was prepared to assume this was the case.
The judge declared:
I have assumed for the purpose of this ruling that Ms. Al Qattan
wants to wear the nikab in court for religious reasons, and that her
religious beliefs are strongly held. In other words, I accept that the
right of religious freedom is engaged. I also accept that it is a very
important right, which may go to the core of a person’s identity.
Likewise, I accept that the right to participate in public life is
engaged and that it is an important right. 220

The law of courtroom behavior in Australia prohibits wearing
anything that might indicate disrespect or offense towards the justice
system, 221 so the ruling was explicit in noting that this was not a factor
in the outcome. The Judge confirmed this, asserting, “I do not consider
the wearing of nikabs in court for religious reasons to be disrespectful,
offensive or threatening, although, as I will explain shortly, I do
consider it to be an impediment to the deterrence and punishment of
misbehavior by spectators in the public gallery.” 222 The desire to wear
religious dress in court should, the court noted, be allowed “as much as
possible” but not without limit:
Australia is obviously a multicultural society and I agree that
religious dress should be accommodated as much as possible, but
the right of religious freedom and the right to participate in public
life are not absolutes. As s[ection] 7 of the Charter recognizes,
these rights may be subject to limitations which can be
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom. 223
219. Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 5.
220. Id.
221. See,
e.g.,
Court
Etiquette,
HIGH
COURT
OF
AUSTRALIA,
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/about/court-etiquette [https://perma.cc/62CZ-M6BG] (last visited
Apr. 25, 2019) (stating that “inappropriate clothing may not be worn" You should be adequately
and neatly dressed, including footwear”).
222. Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 6.
223. Id. ¶ 18; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic.) s 7(2) (Austl.)
(“A human right may be subject under law only to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and
taking into account all relevant factors including—(a)the nature of the right; (b) the importance
of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relationship
between the limitation and its purpose; (e) any less restrictive means reasonably available to
achieve the purpose that the limitation seeks to achieve).
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The question of modesty in appearance was also raised. The court
quoted the following from an Explanatory Note issued by the
Australian National Imams Council (“ANIC”):
Muslim women commonly wear a headscarf referred to as a Hijab
to cover their head and hair. On fewer occasions, women may wear
a Burka or Nikab, which also covers their face. The Hijab and
Burka or Nikab are seen as a sign of modesty, and a symbol of
religious faith. [Italics added by the court]. 224

The court responded in the following terms:
A requirement that spectators have their faces uncovered is not to
force anyone to act immodestly. First, the exposure of one’s face
in a courtroom cannot reasonably be viewed as an immodest act:
subjective views to the contrary cannot rule the day, or the
management of a courtroom. Second, if someone feels strongly
that it would be improper for them to uncover their face in court,
they can choose not to attend. If that is Ms. Al Qattan’s choice,
arrangements will be made for live streaming of the proceedings
to a remote facility within the court building so that she can still
view the trial. 225

It is not known whether the opportunity that Ms. Al Qattan might
view the proceedings from a remote location was taken up. The
Australian case of Elzahed was also cited as supporting Ms. Al Qattan’s
argument in favor of wearing the nikab, as were three foreignjurisdiction cases: Police v. Razamjoo (New Zealand), 226 R v. D
(England), 227 and NS v. The Queen (Canada). 228 The submission was
that all of these cases supported wearing the nikab in court in some
circumstances and so should be extended to wearing them in all
circumstances.

224. Australian National Imams Council, supra note 202; see Court Etiquette, supra note
222. Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R. 408, 441.
225. Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 24
226. Police v. Razamjoo [2005] DCR 408, 441. For a valuable discussion of the case and
its surrounding issues, see Rex J. Ahdar, Religious Liberty in a Temperate Zone: A Report from
New Zealand, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 205, 225-227 (2007).
227. R v. D(R) [2013] UKSC (unreported, Crown Court at Blackfriars, Murphy J), Judge
Peter Murphy, 16 September 2013), available at https://www.judiciary.uk/wpcontent/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/The+Queen+-v-+D+(R).pdf
[https://perma.cc/YD2M-TUTM].
228. NS v. The Queen [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726; [2012] SCC 72.
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In Razamjoo, two witnesses for the prosecution wanted to wear
the nikab but were ultimately ordered to remove them while giving
evidence. 229 They were, however, allowed to give evidence from
behind a screen thus limiting their exposure to women court officials,
the judge, and counsel. 230 In NS v. The Queen, the Supreme Court of
Canada affirmed a lower court ruling requiring that a nikab be removed
while evidence was given, but refused to make this an absolute rule.231
In R v. D, a person charged with intimidating a witness requested to
wear a nikab during their trial. 232 This request was granted except for
the times when the accused was giving evidence. 233 While finding these
cases somewhat persuasive, Beale J distinguished them because:
these cases suggest that witnesses may wear a nikab if they are not
giving contested evidence and that an accused, where identity is
not in issue, may wear a nikab except when testifying. If
participants in court proceedings may wear nikabs in certain
circumstances, then it follows, so the argument goes, that
spectators in the public gallery may do so. But there is at least one
point of distinction. An accused is compelled to be present in court
and, more often than not, witnesses for the prosecution are
subpoenaed to attend court. Ms. Al Qattan is under no legal
compulsion to attend court. 234

The case of R v. Chaarani has been criticized as disappointing for
those desiring to exercise their right to religious freedom in the State of
Victoria. 235 Despite this criticism, the issue of court security, the

229. Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R. 408
230. Id.
231. In Justice Beale’s summary, he noted, “McLachlin CJ, Deschamps, Fish and
Cromwell JJ [of the Supreme Court of Canada] dismissed the complainant’s appeal but indicated
that, what they called an extreme approach—never allowing a witness to testify in a nikab or
always permitting it—was unsustainable and that it may be permissible for a witness to testify
in a nikab if their evidence is uncontested. Le Bel and Rothstein JJ, who agreed in the result,
preferred a clear rule that nikabs not be worn by witnesses at any stage of a criminal trial.”
Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 14.
232. R v. D(R) [2013] UKSC (unreported, Crown Court at Blackfriars, Murphy J).
233. Id.
234. The Queen v Chaarani (Ruling 1) [2018] VSC 387 (16 July 2018).
235. Sarah Hort, Victorian Supreme Court Finds Charter Does Not Protect Right to Wear
Nikab in Court, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CENTRE (July 16, 2018), https://www.hrlc.org.au/humanrights-case-summaries/2018/12/17/victorian-supreme-court-finds-charter-does-not-protectright-to-wear-nikab-in-court [https://perma.cc/E8J8-ZVBL].
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possibility of a mistrial, 236 and the proper ordering and regulation of
witnesses seem to be entirely legitimate reasons for the limitation
imposed in this case. 237 The individual judge has power over the
courtroom, and this extends, on the whole, not only to members of the
public and the accused but also to the lawyers and other officials. 238
3. Lessons from Elzahed and Chaarani
These two cases (Elzahed v. NSW and R v. Chaarani) show
Australian superior courts grappling with questions of evidence law,
courtroom demeanor, and to some degree, conscience or religiousbased desires to dress in a certain way while participating in the court
process. In neither case is the main protagonist a simple witness. In
Elzahed, they are a plaintiff/witness, and in Chaarani, they are a mere
courtroom spectator, albeit one tied closely to the defendant. 239
It would be a mistake to draw too many parallels between these
cases and the major German constitutional cases already discussed.
They are different in many significant ways: the courtroom is not the
schoolroom, and the plaintiff/witness problems bear little resemblance
to the teacher (or student) seeking to wear religious dress in the
classroom or school, while in the employ of the government.
Thus, it may be reasonably argued that while the Australian cases
may be of mild interest to a German lawyer, and the German cases
likewise for an Australian (or common) lawyer, they are vastly
different and not comparable in any meaningful way, save for the fact
that they involve the legal permission to wear (or not wear) female
236. The judge noted, “In some cases, things said or done by spectators may necessitate
the discharge of a jury, which may cause great distress to participants in the trial, not to mention
the cost to the community.” Chaarani, VSC 387, ¶ 21.
237. “Deterrence, identification and proof are all served by a requirement that spectators
in the public gallery have their faces uncovered. The efficacy of an order for witnesses out of
court is also facilitated by such a requirement.” Id. ¶ 19. The court provided a footnote
explanation to this reasoning in the following terms: “To preserve the integrity of the court
process, it is commonplace for witnesses to be ordered to remain out of court until they have
given their evidence. But if spectators can wear face coverings in court, a witness may be able
to circumvent such an order.” Id. ¶ 19 n.10.
238. But see, for example, the Australian High Court case of MacGroarty v. Clauson
[1989] HCA 34, holding that a charge of contempt against a barrister was not sufficiently
delineated by the judge in accordance with the relevant section of the District Courts Act (1967)
(Qld), and so the conviction was overturned.
239. See generally Moutia Elzahed & Anors v Commonwealth of Australia and State of
NSW [2016] NSWDC 353. See generally Queen v. Chaarani [2018] VSC 387.
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headwear in both fact scenarios. Thus both engage primary human
rights relating to religion. Moreover, the German cases concern
headwear that still shows the full face whereas both Australian cases
concern clothing that obscures the face almost entirely. There is one
serious caveat to the above lessons, and this relates to the lack of
comprehensive religious freedom laws in Australia discussed above.
For as long as there is no such Australian guarantee of this fundamental
right at a constitutional level, the Australian approach will remain
piecemeal and potentially incoherent.
VII. CONCLUSION
As Denise Meyerson has noted, “the formal protections afforded
religious freedom under Australian law are relatively weak—
particularly when compared to many other liberal democracies.” 240 By
contrast, Germany has constitutionalized protections for religion and
conscience, which have been litigated seriously and at length over
many decades since the end of World War II and most recently in the
crucifix and headscarf cases. The recent Australian court cases dealing
with these issues are grounded in the law of process, evidence, and
courtroom demeanor and are bubbling up toward an as yet non-existent
all-encompassing set of principles, upon which coherent judicial norms
for freedom of conscience at a constitutional - or at least a national level can be based. These principles will not appear out of thin air but
must be deliberated and decided in the light of present irregularities.
The German constitutional guarantees, together with their judicial
interpretations, provide a valuable model for this and will repay
thoughtful and disciplined consideration by Australian policymakers
and judges alike.

240. Meyerson, supra note 22, at 552.
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